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— -{PROPOSED ORDER]1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________ _______ ___________ _____________ _ J
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, «fa/.
)
:)
Plaintiffs,
• )
;)
v.
; )
;)
MYLAN LABORATORIES, INC.,
! )
CAMBREX CORP.,
)
PROFARMACO SJLL., and
! )
GYMA LABORATORIES OF AMERICA, INC., j )
and SST Corporation.,
: )
:)
Défendante.
: )
____________
J
I)
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
j)

Case No. MDL 1290
Civ. No. 1:98-CV-3115 (TFH)
Mise. No. 990276 (TFH/JMF)

F IL H )

m

2 8 2002

Civ. No. 1:98-CV-3114 (TFH)

i)

MYLAN LABORATORIES, INC.,
) Mise. No. 990276 (TFH/JMF)
CAMBREX CORP.,
•!)
PROFARMACO SJLL.,
I)
GYMA LABORATORIES OF AMERICA, INC., )
)
Defendants.
)
________ - ________________________________ J
DISTRIBUTION ORDER - CONSUMER SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS

WHEREAS Plaintiff States, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), and Mylan
Laboratories, Inc., Gyma Laboratories of America, Inc., Profarmaco S.r.l., and Cambrex
Corporation (“Settling Defendants") entered into settlement o f this litigation;
1
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WHEREAS pursuant to Section V (Consumer Distribution Plan), Paragraph A o f
the Memorandum in Support o f the Motion for Find Approval, Plaintiffs have submitted
i
a Monetary Distribution Report for review and approval by the Court with respect to the
distribution to consumers with valid claims;
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1,

That the Settlement Administrator, Rust Consulting, Inc., is authorized to

commence immediately the distribution o f settlement proceeds to consumers filing valid
claims as listedon the Monetary Distribution Report, which Report is hereby approved;
and
2.

That the Settlement Administrator is further authorized pay any consumer

claims that may be validated subsequent to the date o f this Distribution Order, but prior to
the close o f the Settlement administration.

SO ORDERED this

2002.

day o f

Honorable Thomas F. ]
Chief Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
■ ••
'
IN RE LORAZEPAM & CLORAZEPATE
ANTITRUST LITIGATION

■ • y . ,

•

■

)
)
)
)
)
. )
)
)

.

This Opinion applies to:
-V ■
■
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
' '•

:/

'

-

’

MDL Docket No. 1290 (TFH)
Mise. No. 99ms276 (TFH)

)
)
)-

■ ,

FILED

)

V.

>

)
)
)
)
and
)
)
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, et a l.
)
Plaintiffs, • <
)
)
v.
)
)
MYLAN LABORATORIES, INC. et al..
)
Defendants.
)
>
"■*:
and
)
• .
• •
■)
UNITED WISCONSIN SERVICES, INC., et a l. )
Plaintiffs,
)
’
' V
•.
)

FEB -1 200).

MYLAN LABORATORIES, INC. et al..
Defendants.

.

-

V.

_

)

'• ■
MYLAN LABORATORIES, INC. et a l.
Defendants.

■" •

rtANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON, OJERK

",

;•
and

ARKANSAS CARPENTERS HEALTH
AND WELFARE FUND,
Plaintiff,
:.

•■■■■

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

*

ttfc PISTR1C COURT

)
)
)
)
)

V.

MYLAN LABORATORIES» INC. et al..
Defendants.

________________________________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION Re: Settlement
Pending before the Court are several motions for final approval of various settlement
agreements reached in this MDL action. The Federal Trade Commission and all fifty states and
the District of Columbia seek final approval of their settlement agreements with the defendants,
which this Court preliminarily approved on April 27, 2001, and the third party payors seek final
approval of settlement agreements preliminarily approved on February 9, 2001. Upon careful
consideration of the motions and the affidavits, declarations, and reports filed in support thereof,
the objections to the settlements filed by various class members, the representations made by all
parties at the fairness hearing held on November 29, 2001, and the entire record herein, the Court
will grant each motion.
%

I. BACKGROUND1
A. Plaintiff States
On December 22, 1998, ten states ("Litigating States") and the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") filed lawsuits with this Court, charging the defendants with entering illegal
agreements to monopolize the markets for the generic anti-anxiety drugs, lorazepam and

1
The underlying alleged antitrust violations in this case has been thoroughly discussed in
previous decisions o f this Court, e.g.. FTC v. Mvlan Labs.. Inc.. 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 32-35
(D.D.C. 1999); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig.. 202 F.R.D. 12, 14-17 (D.D.C.
2001), and thus will not be reiterated in full measure here.
-
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-

clorazepate, in violation of various federal and state antitrust laws.2 On February 8, 1999, the
Litigating States amended their complaint, adding twenty-one states and the District of Columbia
as plaintiffs.3 On May 13, 1999, Maryland joined the other thirty-two Litigating States.4
After extensive discovery was conducted, the parties began to explore the possibility of
settlement in late Spring 2000. The FTC, thirty-three Litigating States, Mylan, Cambrex,
Profarmaco, and Gyma reached an agreement in principle in August 2000, under which the
defendants would pay $100 million toward consumer and state agency compensation and an
additional $8 million toward costs and fees for the investigation and litigation in this matter. In
return, the thirty-three Litigating States agreed to exert their best efforts to bring into the
settlement eighteen states ("Joining States") that were not yet a part of this litigation. They were
successful in this endeavor, and on February 1, 2001, all fifty states and the District of Columbia
("Plaintiff States") jointly filed a third amended complaint.5 At the same time, the Plaintiff

2 The original ten Plaintiff States in Connecticut v. Mvlan Labs.. Inc.. No. 98-3115, were
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. They named as defendants Mylan Laboratories, Inc. ("Mylan"),
Cambrex Corporation ("Cambrex"), Profarmaco S.R.L. ("Profarmaco"), Gyma Laboratories of
America, Inc. ("Gyma"), and SST Corporation ("SST"). The FTC's action, FTC v. Mvlan Labs..
No. 98-3114, named Mylan, Cambrex, Profarmaco, and Gyma, but excluded SST.
3 The states, in addition to the District of Columbia, added in the amended complaint
were Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington.
4 Maryland v. Mvlan Labs.. Inc.. No. 99-1158.
5 In addition, the FTC and the defendants worked out the terms of a "Stipulated
Permanent Injunction" andjointly moved for its approval on November 29, 2000. The Court
reviewed the injunction with the parties on the record at a hearing held on December 4,2000, and
it approved it at a hearing held on February 9, 2001. Under the February 9 ,2001 Order and
Stipulated Permanent Injunction, the defendants were required to pay the $ 100 million,
$71,782,017.00 o f which will be used to pay the claims o f consumers residing within the Plaintiff
States, and $28,217,983.00 of which will be used to pay state agency claims. The injunction also
-3-

States filed two settlement agreements for the Court's review: the "Mylan Settlement Agreement"
between the FTC, Plaintiff States, Mylan, Cambrex, Profarmaco, and Gyma; and the "SST
Settlement Agreement" between the Plaintiff States and SST. After a hearing on April 27, 2001,
the Court preliminarily approved both settlement agreements, the distribution plans, and the
notice plan and consumer claims procedure, and it conditionally certified a class of plaintiffs for
purposes of settlement only. The FTC and Plaintiff States now seek final approval of the
settlements.
B. Third Party Payors
There are also two third party payor actions before the Court. On May 3, 1999, United
Wisconsin Services filed the first action here against Mylan, Cambrex, and Gyma, United
Wisconsin Services. Inc, v. Mvlan Labs.. Inc.. No. 99-1082.6 The plaintiffs in United Wisconsin
are third party payors who paid for prescriptions of generic lorazepam and clorazepate filled
between January 1, 1998 and December 31,1999 on behalf o f health benefit plan members who
reside in twenty states—Arizona, California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia, and

prohibits all of the defendants from entering exclusive action pharmaceutical ingredient ("API")
agreements with nonparties, and Mylan will be prohibited from entering agreements with their
codefendants that would prohibit them from selling lorazepam or clorazepate. Each defendant
also will have to report to the Commission its compliance with this order within ninety days of
the date of the Order and annually for the next five years.
6
On February 15, 2000, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc. and Group
Hospitalization and Medical Services, Inc. d/b/a Carefirst Blue Cross BlueShield, Inc. joined the
lawsuit as plaintiffs in an amended complaint.
-4-

Wisconsin—that have specific indirect purchaser statutes or case law permitting private parties to
sue in such a capacity. On January 25, 2001, third party payors in thirty-one other
states—Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming—filed the other action before the Court,
Arkansas Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund v. Mvlan Labs.. Inc.. No. 01-0159, to effectuate
the settlement of the their claims that had been pending in related state court actions.7
Pursuant to orders of the Court, the plaintiffs engaged in extensive coordinated pretrial
discovery of the defendants, SST, and other nonparty witnesses. This discovery included the
review and analysis of thousands of documents and the taking of more than seventy depositions.
The plaintiffs also met with counsel for the FTC and Plaintiff States to engage in further
cooperative discovery and investigation. And with their consulting expert, the plaintiffs
reviewed and analyzed extensive sales data concerning the generic drugs at issue in this case
during the relevant period.
In March 2000, the parties began settlement negotiations. They reached an agreement on
settlement amounts by July 2000 and completed negotiations on other terms and conditions of
settlement in January 2001. The third party payor plaintiffs, the defendants, and SST executed a
Stipulation of Settlement ("Settlement Agreement") in each case on January 29,2001. After a

7
Third party payor plaintiffs had originally filed an action on December 23, 1998 in state
court in Tennessee, Middle Tennessee Teamsters Trust Fund v. Mvlan Laboratories. Inc.. No. 983833 (II). Another action was filed in February 1999 in state court in New Jersey, Cement
Masons Local Union No. 699 Health and Welfare Fund v. Mvlan Laboratories. Inc.. No. MER-L000431-99.
-
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hearing held on February 9, 2001, the Court preliminarily approved both Settlement. Agreements
and conditionally certified the respective third party payor classes for settlement purposes only.
n . DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff States
The FTC and Plaintiff States moved for final approval o f their settlement agreements on
November 5,2001, specifically seeking: (1) final approval of the Mylan Settlement Agreement
and the SST Settlement Agreement;8 (2) final approval of the Plaintiff States' proposed
distribution plans; (3) final approval of the payment of the costs of notice and claims
administration; (4) final approval of the payment of attorneys' fees and litigation costs; and (5)
both a final ruling that certain states have authority to represent consumers and to settle and
release their claims, and a final certification of the following class for settlement purposes only:
All natural person consumers within Plaintiff States where such a class action may
be brought, not otherwise represented by the Plaintiff States as parens patriae,
who purchased generic lorazepam and/or clorazepate sold in the United States
from January I, 1998 through December 31, 1999.
11/5/01 Mot. at 2.

(1) Final Approval of Settlement Agreements
Approval of a proposed class action settlement lies within the discretion of this Court. In
re: Vitamins Antitrust Litig,, 2001-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1J73,361, 2001 WL 856290, at *1 (D.D.C.
July 19, 2001); United States v. District of Columbia. 933 F. Supp. 42, 67 (D.D.C. 1996).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or

8 SST also filed a brief supporting final approval of its settlement with the Plaintiff States.
-
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compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e).9 The Rule 23 requirements are fully consistent with the long-standing
judicial attitude favoring class action settlements. Mavfield v. Barr. 985 F.2d 1090, 1092 (D.C.
Cir. 1993). While the Court should "scrutinize the terms of the settlement carefully," the
discretion to reject a settlement is thus "restrained by the 'principle of preference' that encourages
settlements." Pigford v. Glickman. 185 F.R.D. 82,103 (D.D.C. 19991: see also United States v.
District o f Columbia. 933 F. Supp. at 47 (" 'The trial court in approving a settlement need not
inquire into the precise legal rights of the parties nor reach and resolve the merits o f the claims or
controversy, but need only determine that the settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable and
appropriate under the particular facts and that there has been valid consent by the concerned
parties.' ") (quoting Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch. 718 F.2d 1117,1126 (D.C. Cir.
1983)).
There is no single test in this Circuit for determining whether a proposed class action
settlement should be approved under Rule 23(e), and the relevant factors may vary depending on
the factual circumstances. Pigford 185 F.R.D. at 98 & n.13 (citing Thomas v. Albright. 139 F.3d

9
State laws authorizing the Attorney Generals to bring and settle actions as parens
patriae, like their federal counterpart, section 4C of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(l), set
forth no specific standards for approving a proposed settlement. Given the fact that courts
generally have utilized the Rule 23 standards when evaluating parens patriae actions for
settlement purposes under the federal statute, see. e.g„ New York v. Reebok Inf L Ltd.. 903 F.
Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("15 U.S.C. § 15c(c) requires court approval of the settlement of a
parens patriae antitrust suit, but it does not specify the standards required for approval. Courts
generally look to thee standards used in approving class action settlements under Rule 23(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."), and the fact that eight states in this action are in fact
proceeding under Rule 23, see infra pp. 33-36, the Court finds the Rule 23 standards appropriate
for evaluating this settlement.
-7-

227, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Generally, in determining whether a settlement should be approved,
courts consider whether the proposed settlement "is fair, reasonable, and adequate under the
circumstances and whether the interests of the class as a whole are being served if the litigation is
resolved by settlement rather than pursued." Manual for Complex Litigation ('Third). § 30.42 at
238 (1995). In making this determination, courts in this Circuit have examined the following
factors: (a) whether the settlement is the result of arms-length negotiations; (b) the terms of thé
settlement in relation to the strength of plaintiffs' case; (c) the stage of the litigation proceedings
at the time of settlement; (d) the reaction of the class; and (e) the opinion of experienced counsel.
See Thomas. 139 F.3d at 231-33: Pigford. 185 F.R.D. at 98-101; Osher v. SCA Realty I. 945 F.
Supp. 298, 304 (D.D.C. 1996); Stewart v. Rubin. 948 F. Supp. 1077,1087 (D.D.C. 1996), affd,
124 F.3d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Prav v. Lockheed Corn.. 644 F. Supp. 1289, 1290 (D.D.C.
19861: In re Nat'l Student Marketing Litie.. 68 F.R.D. 151, 155 (D.D.C. 19741: see also Moore v.
Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers. Inc.. 762 F.2d 1093,1106 (D.C. Cir. 1985). As set forth below, the
Court finds the Mylan Settlement Agreement and the SST Settlement Agreement fair,
reasonable, and adequate, and accordingly will approve both settlements.
(a) Arms-Length Negotiations
"A 'presumption of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness may attach to a class
settlement reached in arms-length negotiations between experienced, capable counsel after
meaningful discovery.' " In re: Vitamins. 2001 WL 856290, *2 (quoting Manual for Complex •
Litigation (Third) § 30.42 (1995)). No one has challenged the FTC's and Plaintiff States'
representation to the Court that the settlement before it is the product of extensive arms-length
negotiations by experienced counsel, undertaken in good faith after substantial factual
-8 -

investigation and discovery. Indeed, experienced counsel on all sides conducted lengthy and
adversarial negotiations, involving numerous face-to-face meetings and telephone conferences,
and they exchanged several proposals before reaching the current agreements. The FTC and
Plaintiff States further retained experts to aid their evaluation of the potential liability, damages,
and fairness of the settlement amounts, See, e.g.. Affidavit of Laurits R. Christensen, 11/5/01
Mot., Tab 5

4-30 (detailing analyses and opinion that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and

adequate). The Court thus finds that the settlements were ultimately reached through aims-length
negotiations.
(b) Terms o f Settlement in Relation to Strength o f Plaintiffs' Case
Under the Mylan Settlement Agreement, Mylan has agreed to pay $100 million cash in
exchange for the release o f the claims against it in this matter. Mylan specifically will wire
$71,782,017 to a segregated escrow account ("Consumer Fund”) to be used for the payment of
consumer claims, and it will wire $28,217,983 to another segregated escrow account ("Agency
Account") to be used for the payment of state agency claims. See Mylan Settlement Agreement
§§ IV.A, VI.A-D. Mylan has further agreed to pay an additional $8 million, which will be wired
to another segregated escrow account ("Cost and Fee Account"), to be used for the payment of
the Litigating States' attorneys' fees and costs. See id. § IVJB.10
Under the SST Settlement Agreement, SST agrees to pay a total o f $2 million for the

10
Together, the Agency Account and the Cost and Fee Account comprise the "State
Fund." Mylan Settlement Agreement § I.AA.
-9-

release of all claims against it in this action and related actions.11 Of the $2 million total,
$500,000 will be allocated to the Plaintiff States in this case. Specifically, SST will wire
$266,250 to a segregated escrow account ("SST Consumer Fund") for the payment o f consumer
claims, $108,750 to a segregated escrow account ("SST Agency Account") for the payment of
state agency claims, and $125,000 to a segregated escrow account ("SST Cost and Fee Account")
for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs. See SST Settlement Agreement § HLA-B.
The FTC initially prayed for disgorgement of $120 million in its complaint, and the $100
million that will be recovered through this settlement represents over 80% of that amount. The
Plaintiff States' expert estimated total cash damages to consumer purchasers during the
monopolization and price-fixing conspiracy, in terms of overcharges, o f approximately $111
million, see Affidavit of Laurits R. Christensen, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 5 f 11,112 and the settlement

11 Upon final approval of all settlements, the $2 million will be allocated as follows: (1)
$500,000 will go to the settlement in this action; (2) $400,000 wifi go to the settlements in
United Wisconsin and Arkansas Carpenters, discussed below; (3) $500,000 will go the
settlement in Advocate Health Care v. Mvlan Labs., fee.. No. 99-0790; (4) $100,000 will go to
the settlement in the Generic Drug Antitrust Cases: Mvlan Generic Drug Antitrust Pharmacy.
Judicial Counsel Coordination Proceeding No. 4075 ("Galloway action") (pending in the
Superior Court o f the State of California for the County of San Francisco); and (5) $500,000 will
be divided among the various settlements with up to half of it going toward the notice costs in
SST's settlement with the direct purchasers in the Advocate action and the remainder going in
three equal parts to the settlement funds in this action, the Galloway action, and the Advocate
action. See SST Settlement Agreement § JR.A.
12 The damages estimated by the Plaintiff States' expert are based on the actual overcharge
paid by consumers. See Affidavit of Laurits R, Christensen, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 5 6-9.
Although consumers could potentially recover treble damages, the standard for evaluating
settlement involves a comparison of the settlement amount with the estimated single damages.
In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litre.. 82 F.R.D- 652, 654 (D.D.C. 1979) ("The recovery o f actual
single damages must be the basis for the Court's assessment o f monetary recovery in an antitrust
settlement.") /citing Detroit v. Grinned Corp.. 495 F.2d448 (2d Cir. 1974)). Moreover, many
states do not permit the recovery of treble damages, and in any event, the recovery o f treble
damages is far from certain in light of the considerations detailed below.
-10-

provides $71,782,017 to consumers who purchased the drugs during the relevant time period,
which represents 65% of all estimated consumer damages.13 The fact that this settlement amount
is less than the total estimated damages is not surprising and ultimately does not render the terms
of the settlement unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate in the Court's opinion, as several additional
factors should be taken into consideration. Continued litigation of these lawsuits would
undoubtedly require substantial additional pretrial preparation and expense, as the defendants
have denied all liability. Such preparation would likely involve dozens of witnesses, including
several experts, and thousands of pages o f documents. Further litigation also entails substantial
risks; given the defendants' denial of liability, monetary recovery certainly cannot be assumed.
Moreover, the defendants have argued that even if they are liable, they can be held responsible
only for price increases charged by manufacturers to wholesalers, not for retail price increases,
upon which the expert predicated his $111 million estimate. The defendants have further
contended that if liable, they can be held responsible only for damages resulting for the time
period ending with the termination of the alleged illegal supply agreements, rather than the
conclusion of 1999 as used in the expert's estimate. Also, the expert's estimate accounts for the
damages suffered in all fifty states, and the District of Columbia, yet it is less than certain that all
states could have otherwise sought monetary damages, due to the lack of Illinois Brick repealers.
All of these factors would operate to reduce the total potentially recoverable damages in this
case. See Affidavit of Laurits R. Christensen, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 5 f f 12-18. Finally, counsel
has represented to the Court that based on the number of claimants, which is less than the total
13
The expert additionally estimated Medicaid damages in the amount of $59.5 million,
and as noted above, the Plaintiff States' government agencies will receive $28,217,983. See
Affidavit o f Laurits R. Christensen, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 5 f 11.
-1 1 -

number of consumers allegedly damaged, the claimants are expected to receive reimbursement
for the full amount of their damages. See 11/5/01 Mot, at 14-15:11/29/01 Tr. at20-21.14 After
considering all of these factors and thoroughly reviewing the representations of counsel and the
report o f Plaintiff States' expert, see Affidavit of Laurits R. Christensen, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 5
5-18, the Court finds the terms of the settlement fair, reasonable, and adequate when juxtaposed
to the strength o f the plaintiffs' case.
(c) Status o f the Litigation at the Time o f Settlement
Early settlement of these types of cases is encouraged. See, e.g.. In re: Vitamins Antitrust
Litig.. 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)1J72,726,1999 WL 1335318, *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 23,1999) ("The
pursuit of early settlement is a tactic that merits encouragement; it is entirely appropriate to
reward expeditious and efficient resolution of disputes.") (citing In re Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co.
Sec, Litig.. 643 F. Supp. 148, 151 (S .D. Ohio 1986), and Muchnick v. First Fed. Sav. <Ss Loan
Ass'n of Philadelphia. 1986 WL 10791, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1986)). Courts thus consider
whether counsel had sufficient information, through adequate discovery, to reasonably assess the

14 As stated by counsel for the Plaintiff States:
We feel that we can fully pay—and this is based on our expert's analysis and
based on the average claim that we think is the actual amount of the claim that's
going to be paid—we feel that we can.pay up to 250,000 claims at full damage
and still have sufficient money to pay all the claims at this point in time. At this
point in time we have 244,000 claims, 244,820. Now, these claims have not been
verified, and some of them may not be valid, some of them may have been fully
reimbursed by insurance of some other things, but those are the total number of
claims that we have.. . . At the present time, Your Honor, I mentioned this
244,820 potential claims. We expect to pay those at 100 percent of the calculated
damages.
11/29/01 Tr. at 20-21.
-12-

risks o f litigation vis-à-vis the probability of success and range of recovery. See, e.g.. Ressler v.
Jacobson. 822 F. Supp. 1551, 1554-55 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (stating that "[t]he law is clear that early
settlements are to be encouraged, and accordingly, only some reasonable amount of discovery
should be required to make these determinations" and concluding that "the plaintiffs [had]
conducted sufficient discovery to be able to determine the probability of their success on the
merits, the possible range of recovery, and the likely expense and duration of the litigation")
(citing In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litie.. 643 F.2d 195, 211 (5th Cir. 1981), and Cotton
v. Hinton. 559 F.2d 1326, 1332 (5th Cir. 1977)); Luevano v. Campbell. 93 F.RJD. 68, 86 (D.D.C.
1981) ("In evaluating the fairness and adequacy o f a settlement, it is important to consider
whether the settlement was reached after extensive factual development, so that counsel on both
sides would have had information sufficient to make a reasonable assessment of their risks of
litigation.").
The Court is convinced that the Plaintiff States had sufficient information to adequately
assess the risks of this litigation at the time of settlement. Within a few months of the price
increases by Mylan, the FTC and Plaintiff States began an investigation, which included
subpoenas and hearings conducted by the FTC. After filing lawsuits, they conducted extensive
discovery, which included interviewing and deposing over 100 potential witnesses and reviewing
thousands of documents. Over the nearly three-year duration of this litigation, the parties
obtained a significant amount o f information for adequately evaluating the merits o f the claims
and potential defenses. By entering a settlement agreement prior to summary judgment motions,
moreover, the parties avoided significant expense and guaranteed a cash recovery. The Court
therefore concludes that the parties had adequate information at the time they entered their
-13-

settlement agreements.
(d) Reaction o f Class
The Court finds that the settlement group's reaction to this settlement has been
overwhelmingly positive and supports approval. After notice was nationally disseminated
through newspapers, magazines, television, the Internet, point-of-sale displays at over 55,000
pharmacies, and direct mailings to over 1 million consumers, only nine consumers submitted
objections, 2,351 opted out, and approximately 24.4,820 have submitted claims for refunds. See
11/5/01 Mot. at 18; Affidavit of Jeffrey D. Dahl, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 2 f t 18-19; 11/29/01 Tr. at
20- 21.
The existence of a relatively few objections certainly counsels in favor of approval, see,
e,g„ New York v. Keds C om . 1994-1 Trad Cas (CCH) f70,549, 1994 WL 97201, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1994) ("Given th[e] sales volume, the paucity of objections and statements of
preference revealed by the record militates in favor of the settlements . . . ."),i5 and after
reviewing each one of them, the Court can find no impediment to approval. While the Court
appreciates the objections, several of them can be dispensed with expeditiously. Ms. Dorothy
Bran filed an objection stating merely that she "objectfs] to the settlement," and Ms. Verna Parks
similarly objected to class actions generally. Without significant elaboration on their positions,

15
The Court also finds no reason to disapprove the settlement stemming from the 2,351
opt-outs. This number is relatively low, representing a mere 0.2% of the 1,281,128 recipients of
notice (0.2%) or approximately 1% of the 244,820 claimants. Cf.. e.g„ Pigford v. Glickman. 185
F.RJD. 82,102 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding 5% to be a "low rate of opt-outs" when 85 farmer class
members elected to opt out of the class after 1686 completed claim packages). The number more
likely reflects the sufficiency and ultimate success of the notice moire than some general
dissatisfaction with the settlement, which is evidenced by the relatively low number of opt-outs
and the relatively low number of objections filed.
-14-

needless to say, such broad statements are of little aid to the Court in determining whether these
settlements are fair, adequate, and reasonable. Messrs. W.C. Roehl and Herbert Goldman
objected to the settlements because the retail cost of drugs is the same today. As a general
matter, their point is well taken. But no illegal conduct by retail drug stores was alleged in this
lawsuit. It does not, therefore, affect retailers, only generic manufacturers. Mr. Kenneth O'Mara
objected to the settlements out of a fear that there would be a lack of refunds for variable co-pay
purchases of the drugs. But as the FTC and Plaintiff States point out, consumers with variable
co-pays are eligible to receive reimbursement and with valid claims will recover the same
percentage as consumers who paid cash. See infra note 18. Finally, Ms. Toba Olson,
represented by counsel Lawrence W. Schonbrun, filed a notice of her desire "to reserve her right
to appear for the purpose of speaking in favor of class counsel's request for an attorneys' fee
award of $8,125,000 in the.instant litigation," but also expressed confusion about the meaning
"Related Litigation" and thus objected to the $4 million to be allocated to Co-Lead Counsel, until
she could better understand where the money would be spent. Counsel for the plaintiffs
thoroughly explained these fees at the fairness hearing, and Ms. Olson did not appear to contest
their representations or elaborate upon her objections. The Court is satisfied that the fees are
reasonable. See infra pp. 28-30.
Several more substantial, yet unavailing, objections were filed by Ms. Cathy Shirley, Mr.
Ronald Weintraub, and Ms. Lillie Mae Boone. They objected to the Mylan settlement on the
bases that the published notice is deficient as it does not inform class members of the size of the
class and provides ambiguous information about the value of the settlement benefits, the claim
form requirements pose an undue burden on class members, the settlement amount is inadequate

-
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considering the allegations of Mylan's pricing policies, and the proposed distribution plan is
unfair because it allows for cy pres distribution. However, there is no requirement, that the class

size be specified in the notice, see, e.g.. Vancouver Women's Health Collective Soc. v. A.H.
Robins Co.. 820 F.2d 1359, 1364 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he right to adequate notice simply requires
that the proposed form of notification be reasonably certain to inform those affected."), and the
objectors fail to explain how omitting the class size otherwise affected the adequacy of the
notice. The objectors' contentions about ambiguity in the value of the settlement are incredible in
light of the fact that die notice explains that the defendants will pay $ 100 in cash for full and final
settlement of legal claims and that $71 million of that amount has been deposited for consumer
distribution, notice, and claims administration costs, and that $28 million has been set aside to
reimburse state agencies. The Court also has significant difficulty understanding how the claim
form—which required claimants only to write down their name, address, date of birth, social
security number, answer five "yes or no" questions in order to help them assess their eligibility,
sign, date, attach proof of purchases, and drop the claim in the mail in the postage prepaid
envelope provided—is too burdensome.16 As discussed in the preceding section, the objectors'
claim concerning the inadequacy of the settlement amount is unavailing, as the terms o f the
settlement are fair, reasonable, and adequate when juxtaposed to the strength of the plaintiffs'
case. See Thomas v. Albright. 139 F.3d 227, 234 (D.C, Cir. 1998) ("The court should not reject
a settlement merely because individual class members complain that they would have received
more had they prevailed after a trial."). Finally, counsel for the Plaintiff States satisfactorily

16
Consumers who received notice and waiver materials directly from the pharmacies did
not have to take even these steps.
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explained at the fairness hearing that the cy pres distribution will take place only in the event that
funds still remain after payment of all consumer claims, and if it is utilized, the money cannot be
sent to a charity, but must be used to benefit consumers of these types of purchases, such as at
hospice centers. See 11/29/01 Tr. at 52-53; Consumer Distribution Plan, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 3 at
3; see also infra p. 20. The Court sees no fatal flaw with such a plan.
Finally, Mr. Weintraub, through his counsel Edward Cochran, raised two additional
objections for the first time at the fairness hearing. See 11/29/01 Tr. at 7, 31-32, 43-49. He first
objects to paying the eighteen Joining States $1 million. He believes, based on the Plaintiff
States' expert report concerning the damages calculation and allocation of the settlement fund,
see Affidavit of Laurits R. Christensen, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 5

19-28, that the $1 million

payment to the Joining States unfairly diminishes the consumer fund by $720,000, because that
would be the percentage share (that is, approximately seventy-two percent) otherwise available
for consumer claims. See 11/29/01 Tr. at 44-45, 54-55. But as explained by the Plaintiff States
at the fairness hearing, the $1 million payment to the Joining States was a necessary component
for the settlement; the Litigating States were required to exert their best effort to bring in the
eighteen Joining States, and the $1 million offer for those states' agency claims was the
inducement that brought them in and completed the settlement. See 11/29/01 Tr. at 49-51, 8283. The record supports the Litigating States' position on this issue, and the expert's report is
clear in the calculations, indicating that the Litigating States would receive $27.2 million with the
Joining States receiving $1 million. The Court therefore does not find the settlement unfair,
unreasonable, or inadequate upon Mr. Weintraub's first objection.

Mr. Weintraub's second objection is that the expert excluded percentage co-pays from all
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his calculations of damages. The problem with this exclusion, he contends, is not that the
consumers with percentage co-pays will not be paid, but that the damages calculation is
undervalued. See id. at 45-47, 54-55.17 The Court appreciates the point raised by Mr.
Weintraub, but finds it insufficient to compel a conclusion that the settlement reached is unfair,
unreasonable, or inadequate. The Plaintiff States' expert excluded percentage co-payment
policies from the damages calculation only after considering them and specifically opining that
"the impact of this group on an assessment of the reasonableness of the settlement is de minimis."
Affidavit of Laurits R. Christensen, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 5 If 9 n.3. He based this conclusion on a
survey o f insurance agencies conducted by the Plaintiff States, which revealed that the majority
of the agencies do not offer percentage co-payment plans, and o f those that do, all but one claim
less than one percent of their customers has percentage co-payment plans. Even assuming a onepercent population o f co-pays, the expert estimated that the damages for this group is only 0.2%
o f the estimated damages to third-party payers. Id. The Court finds his conclusion that such
damages are de minimis for the purposes o f evaluating the fairness of the settlement reasonable.
The damages analysis conducted by the expert is not an exact science; as. he details in his report,
many assumptions and mitigating factors must be taken into account in evaluating the fairness of
the settlement amount in light o f other concerns such as the risks of litigation. See id.

6-10,

12-18. For all these reasons, therefore, the Court ultimately concludes that the reaction of the
class favors final approval.

17
He specifically points out that if consumers with percentage co-pays occupy one
percent of the market, that represents $1 million of the $100 million settlement. He also
speculates "that the percentage co-pay may, indeed, be significantly larger than one percent o f the
market." 11/29/01 Tr. at 46.
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(e) Opinion o f Experienced Counsel
Counsel for the FTC, Plaintiff States, and the defendants have considerable expertise in
complex antitrust and class action litigation. Opinion of experienced and informed should be
afforded substantial consideration, see, e.g.. New York v. Reebok Int'l. Ltd.. 903 F. Supp. 532
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), and particularly here, the Court may place greater weight on such opinion in
addressing a settlement negotiated by government attorneys committed to protecting the public
interest. Wellman v. Dickinson. 497 F. Supp. 824, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[T]he participation in
the negotiations resulting in the proposals by a government agency committed to the protection
of the public interest and its endorsement o f the agreement are additional factors which weigh
heavily on the side o f approval of the settlement."); see In re Tovs "R" Us Antitrust Litig.. 191
F.R.D. 347, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Moreover, the participation of the State Attorneys General
furnishes extra assurance that consumers' interests are protected."). Given counsel's experience,
the extensive discovery and lengthy arms-length negotiations conducted in this case, and the
information known to counsel at the time they reach the settlement agreements, the Court will
credit counsel's opinion that these settlements are fair, reasonable, and adequate.
(2) Final Approval of Plaintiff States' Distribution Plans
The Plaintiff States have proposed two distribution plans, which the Court will also
approve. Under the Consumer Distribution Plan, $66,782,017 from the Mylan Settlement
Agreement and $266,250 from the SST Settlement Agreement will be available for compensating
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consumer claims. See Consumer Distribution Plan, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 3 at 1, 4.18 A consumer
claims procedure is being administered by Rust Consulting, under which submitted claim forms
are examined together with supporting purchase documentation, and when incomplete forms are
received, a request for additional information is mailed to the claimant. See id. After final
validation o f all claims, Rust Consulting will prepare a Monetary Distribution Report for the
Court's, review. See id.: Affidavit of Jeffrey D. Dahl, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 2 f l 25. If the Court
grants approval of the Distribution Order, Rust Consulting will distribute the settlement award to
the consumers. If monies remain after that distribution, the Plaintiff States will employ cy pres
distribution among the thirty-three Litigating States, based on each o f the states' respective
percentages of the estimated consumer damages, and each Attorney General will distribute its
share to the State, apolitical subdivision thereof, and/or a charitable organization, with the
express condition that "the funds be used in a manner reasonably targeted to specifically benefit
the health care needs of a substantial number of the persons injured by the increased prices of
lorazépam and/or clorazepate. Consumer Distribution Plan, 11/5/01 M ot, Tab 3 at 3; 11/29/01
Tr. at 52-53.
Under the Government Distribution Plan, $28,217,983 from the Mylan Settlement
Agreement and $108,750 from the SST Settlement Agreement will be available for all state
agency compensation. The eighteen Joining States will receive a total o f $1 million. Each

18
Two categories o f consumers are eligible for reimbursement. The first are
unreimbursed or cash customers, and the second are insured consumers with variable or
percentage copayments. Consumers with Medicaid coverage for prescription drugs, or insurance
for prescription drugs with a fixed co-pay amount, would not be eligible for refunds, as they
suffered no financial harm, but will benefit from the injunctive relief obtained. See 11/5/01 Mot.
at 31-33; Consumer Distribution Plan, 11/5/01 Mot:, Tab 3 at 2-3.
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Joining State will receive a base amount of $10,000, with the remaining $820,000 apportioned
among the Joining States on the basis of each state's percentage of the total estimated
governmental damages. The remaining $27 million will be allocated to the thirty-three Litigating
States based on the respective damages to each state's agencies. Ninety-five percent of the total
amount (that is, approximately $25 million) will be allocated as a share of total estimated
Medicaid damages to each state's agencies. The other five percent (that is, approximately
$1,300,000) will be allocated to non-Medicaid-related damages based on state population.
Finally, the interest generated from the fund will be distributed to all the states as a proportion of
Medicaid damages. See Government Distribution Plan, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 4 at 1-3.
As with settlement agreements, courts consider whether distribution plans are fair,
reasonable, and adequate. In re Chicken Antitrust Litig- 669 F.2d 228, 238 (5th Cir. 1982). The
overall distribution between the consumers and state agencies has been structured to allocate
money in equal proportion to their respective estimated harm. See Affidavit of Laurits R.
Christensen, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 5 f 22. Settlement distributions, such as this one, that thus
apportion funds have been repeatedly deemed fair and reasonable. See, e.g.. Beecher v. Able.
575 F.2d 1010,1013-14 (2d Cir. 1978): In re Chicken. 669 F.2d at 240-42. And here, the
Consumer Distribution Plan is manifestly fair and adequate because it will likely reimburse
consumers in the full amount o f their estimated damages. In the unexpected event that the fund
is insufficient to fully cover all claims, each claimant's recovery will be ratably reduced based on
the ratio of the settlement amount to the total amount of consumer claims, which is a reasonable
approach.
The Court also finds the Government Distribution Plan fair, reasonable, and adequate.

-
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Under state law, the Attorney Generals represent their state agencies in all litigation, and may
settle and release their agency’s claims. Because they are not before the Court under parens
patriae statutes with respect to their agency's claims, therefore, the Court need not approve the
Government Distribution Plan. The parties have nonetheless asked for this Court's approval, and
the Court finds the plan fair and adequate because it allocates settlement hands among the •
Litigating States and among the Joining States based on their respective percentages of estimated
damages, and the greater monetary hand provided to the Litigating States is premised reasonably
upon the greater commitment o f resources and risks undertaken by them in this litigation. The
Court therefore will approve the distributions plans.
(3) Final Approval of Payment of Notice Costs and Claims Administration
Plaintiff States used Rust Consulting and Kinsella Communications to provide extensive
notice through television, newspaper, and magazine advertisements, an Internet website, toll-free
telephone lines, point-of-sale displays at pharmacies, and direct mail to over 1 million
individuals. See 11/5/01 Mot. at 41-52; Affidavit of Katherine Kinsella, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 1 ^flj
8-20; Affidavit of Jeffrey D. Dahl, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 2

7-17, 27-29. After careful review of

their extensive efforts, the Court finds that they constitute "the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). The Plaintiff States and Rust Consulting expended
significant efforts working with some of the nation's largest pharmacy chains to provide direct
mail notice to as many customers as could be.reasonably identified. See Affidavit of Jeffrey D.
Dahl, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 2 ^ 11; see also 11/29/01 Tr. at 22-23. The Plaintiff States, Rust
Consulting, and Kinsella Communications made similar extensive efforts to notify settlement
-
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group members who could not be notified directly, by compiling relevant specific demographic
statistics, and targeting accordingly the use of media including magazines, newspapers,
television, an Internet website, press releases, toll-free telephone lines, and pharmacy point-ofsale displays.19
The cost o f this notice plan and the claims administration is estimated at $8,250,000. See
Affidavit of Mitchell L. Gentile, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 6 ^|3-10; see also Consumer Distribution
Plan, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 3 at 4. This figure exceeds the $5 million originally estimated and
preliminarily approved for such costs. The Plaintiff States justify the increased cost estimate by

averring two factors that necessitated the increased expense. First, the extensive cooperation
provided by the pharmacies in the direct mailing campaign added significant mailing costs and
reimbursement expenses incurred by the pharmacies in computer programming to extract
qualifying purchase records from pertinent databases. Second, the greater response from the
direct notice campaign and from television advertising required additional staff for the claims
administrator to field calls, process waivers, pharmacy records, and claim forms, and respond to
the.unusual amount of correspondence from consumers. See 11/5/01 Mot. at 42-43; Affidavit of
Jeffrey D. Dahl, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 2 Ex. XTV. More important to the Court, the Plaintiff States
explain that the sum available for distribution to consumers will remain virtually "unaltered"
from the amount preliminarily approved, because the estimated $3 million earned in interest on

19
The results were impressive when viewed through the final reach and frequency
numbers. For example, 96.2% of women fifty-five years or older were reached with an average
o f 7.0 opportunities to see the notice, 96.5% of women sixty-five years or older were reached
with an average of 8.2 opportunities to see the notice, and 93.2% of adults thirty-five years or
older were reached with average 5.4 opportunities to see the notice. See Affidavit of Katherine
Kinsella, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 1 f 13; see also 11/29/01 Tr. at 25-26.
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the consumer fim will cover this unexpected increase in expense. 11/5/01 Mot. at 50-51; see
11/29/01 Tr. at 27. And to the Plaintiff States' credit, the number o f consumers submitting
claims for refunds was increased nearly ten-fold over that which was anticipated at the time of
preliminary approval. Overall, the Court finds the cost of such extensive notice efforts, which
have been well documented in the affidavits filed in conjunction with the motion for final
approval, reasonable.
(4) Final Approval of Attorneys' Fees and Costs
Courts have a duty to ensure that claims for attorneys' fees are reasonable. Henslev v.
Eckerhart. 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala. 1 F.3d 1261, 1265 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).20 The D.C. Circuit has joined other circuits in "concluding that a
percentage-of-the-fund method is the appropriate mechanism for determining the attorney fees
award in common fund cases." Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala. 1 F.3d 1261,1271 (D.C. Cir.
1993). Proponents find the percentage-of-recovery method attractive “because it directly aligns
the interests o f the Class and its counsel for the efficient prosecution and early resolution o f
litigation, which clearly benefits both litigants and the judicial system.” In re Am. Bank Note
Holographies. Inc. Sec. Litig.. 127 F. Supp. 2d 418,431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). While fee awards
in common fund cases range from fifteen to forty-five percent, the normal range of fee recovery

20 As the D.C. Circuit has explained:
Special problems exist in assessing the reasonableness of fees in a class action suit
since class members with low individual stakes in the outcome often do not file
objections, and the defendant who contributed to the fund will usually have no
interest in how the fund is divided between the plaintiffs and class counsel.
Swedish Hosp.. 1 F.3dat 1265.
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in antitrust suits is twenty to thirty percent of the common fund. See Swedish Hosp. Corp.. 1
F.3d at 1271-72; see also In re Aetna lnc„ MDL No. 1219, 2001 WL 20928 (E.D. Pa Jan. 4,
2001) (finding thirty percent to constitute a reasonable award); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig..
526 F. Supp. 494, 498 (D.D.C. 1981) (noting that while the bulk of fee awards in antitrust cases
are less than twenty-five percent, several courts have awarded more than forty percent of the
settlement fund). In cases regarded as “mega-fund” cases—that is, recoveries of $100 million or
more—fees of fifteen percent are common. See Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Svs.. Inc.. 91 F.
Supp 2d 942, 989 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (surveying cases decided between 1993 and 1999).
While this Circuit has not yet developed a formal list of factors to be considered in
evaluating fee requests under the percentage-of-recovery method, other jurisdictions have
delineated factors that courts should consider in evaluating fee requests. For example, the court
in Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp,. 223 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000), set forth several factors
including: “(1) the size of the fund created and the number of persons benefitted; (2) the presence
or absence of substantial objections by members o f the class to the settlement terms and/or fees
requested by counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the complexity
and duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the
case by plaintiffs' counsel; and (7) the awards in similar cases." Id at 195 n.l (citing In re
Prudential. 148 F.3d 283, 336-40 (3d Cir. 1998)); In re GM Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods.
Liab. Litig.. 55 F.3d 768, 819-22 (3d Cir. 1995)). And the Tenth Circuit considers what has been
called “the twelve Johnson factors," namely:
[T]he time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the question presented by
the case, the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, the preclusion of
other employment by the attorneys due to acceptance of the case, the customary fee,
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whether the fee is fixed or contingent, any time limitations imposed by the client or
the circumstances, the amount involved and the results obtained, the experience,
reputation and ability of the attorneys, the ‘undesirability' o f the case, the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client, and awards in similar cases.
Rosenbaum v. Macallister. 64 F.3d 1439,1445 (10th Cir. 1995) (listing factors from Johnson v.
Ga. Highway Express. 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)).
There are two fees and costs petitions before the Court. In the first petition, the Plaintiff
States seek approval of up to $8,125,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. Approximately $6.8
million o f that figure will go toward attorneys' fees and $1.3 million will be used to reimburse
out-of-pocket expenses.21 Neither Mylan nor SST objects to the fees and costs submission, see
Affidavit of Andrew E. Aubertine If 7,11/5/01 Mot., Tab 7; see also 11/29/01 Tr. at 33-34, and
the Court finds the request reasonable and will accordingly approve it for the following reasons.
Respecting the. attorneys' fees petition, the Plaintiff States have detailed the lodestar
approach they used to arrive at the $6.8 million fee figure. See Affidavit of Andrew E. Aubertine
9-21, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 7; see also 11/29/01 Tr. at 34-35. They assembled a Fees and Costs
Committee that utilized a four-step approach to arrive at a figure o f $6.4 million for the hours of
the states' attorney and staff time spent in this case up to the point of settlement in August 2000.
The Committee collected information concerning the hours worked by attorneys and litigation
support personnel, established hourly market rates for various classes of attorneys and litigation
support staff based on experience, reduced the time submitted to account for possible
inefficiencies and duplication of effort, and applied the relevant hourly rates to the remaining

21
Mylan agreed to contribute up to $8 million for fees and costs, and the Plaintiff States
now specifically seek $7,985,947.58. SST agreed to contribute $100,000 toward fees and
$25,000 toward costs.
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attorney staff hours. See Affidavit of Andrew E. Aubertine

10,13-20,11/5/01 Mot., Tab 7.

The Plaintiff States additionally set aside $400,000 to reimburse the leadership contribution of
certain states and to partially reimburse them for over 5,000 hours o f attorney and staff time
spend since August 2000. See id

12, 21. Viewed as a percentage of the common fund, the

reasonableness of the fees sought is clear. The $6.8 million fee figure represents less than seven
percent of the settlement fund, which is well within the acceptable range of fee recoveries in
antitrust suits in which there is a common fund. See supra p. 24 (citing In re Am, Bank Note
Holographies. Inc. Sec. Litig.. 127 F. Supp. 2d at 431-32, In re Aetna Inc.. MDL No. 1219, 2001
WL 20928, In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.. 526 F. Supp. at 498, and Shaw. 91 F. Supp. 2d at
989); see also, e.g.. Bebchick v. Washington Metro. Area Transit. 805 F.2d 396, 405 (D.C. Cir
1986) (approving as reasonable attorneys' fees totaling twenty-five percent of common fund);
Swedish H osp . Coro, v. Shalala. 1 F.3d 1261,1271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (approving as reasonable
attorneys' fees totaling twenty percent of common fund). Moreover, the $8 million Mylan
contribution toward the $8,125,000 total in fees and costs requested, was negotiated separately
and is independent of the total common fund It therefore will not reduce the fund at all if
awarded. Affidavit of Andrew E. Aubertine, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 7 f 8. And even though the
$125,000 contribution from SST will be taken from the $500,000 total it will contribute toward
settlement of the Plaintiff States' claims, it represents less than a mere 0.125% of the
$100,500,000 total settlement amount. For these reasons, the fees sought are even more
reasonable, and the Court previously has approved similarly structured fee arrangements. See,
e.g.. In re: Vitamins Antitrust Litig.. 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ^[72,862, 2000 WL 1737867, at
*2 n.3 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2000) ("The separate fund for attorneys fees provides the class, with
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greater certainty as to what each class member would receive from the Settlement, because the
amount that class plaintiffs receive is not reduced by the award o f attorneys' fees.").
The States have also submitted a detailed accounting of the expenses for which they now
seek a reimbursement of approximately $ 1.3 million. See Affidavit of Andrew E. Aubertine
22-26 & Ex. B, 11/5/01 Mot., Tab 7; see also 11/29/01 Tr. at 35-36. After careful review of the
affidavit detailing the. costs, the Court finds that the Plaintiff States reasonably expended the
claimed amount on experts' time to prepare liability and damages analyses, data for the experts'
analyses supplied by IMS Health, Inc., depositions and transcripts, travel, photocopying and
postage, long distance telephone charges, and legal research charges. The Court accordingly
finds the costs request reasonable.
In the second attorneys' fees and costs petition, a separate set of plaintiffs, the State
Purchaser Plaintiffs, seek approval of $4 million.22 Mylan has agreed to pay $4 million in fees
and costs-—beyond the $100 million for consumer and state agency claims and the $8 million for
the Plaintiff States' fees and costs—to the firms o f Zwerling Schachter & Zwerling LLP and
Goodkind Labaton Rudoff & Sucharow LLP ("Indirect Purchaser Lead Counsel") on behalf of
private counsel who participated in the prosecution and resolution o f the State Purchaser

22
On April 27, 2001, the Court granted a stipulated motion for limited intervention by
named plaintiffs ("State Purchaser Plaintiffs") in several related state court indirect purchaser
actions ("State Purchaser Actions"). That order specifically permitted the State Purchaser
Plaintiffs to intervene in the Plaintiff States' action for the limited purpose of commenting on the
settlement and petitioning for the award o f agreed-upon attorneys' fees and costs. As a result of
the Plaintiff States' third amended complaint, the State Purchaser Plaintiffs became members of
the "Settlement Group," which has agreed to release all state and federal law claims against the
defendants, including the claims asserted by the State Purchaser Plaintiffs in their state court
consumer class actions.
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Actions.23 As pointed out by Indirect Purchaser Lead Counsel, the efforts of private counsel for
the State Purchaser Actions contributed significantly to the FTC and Plaintiff States' settlement.
After today's approval of the FTC/Plaintiff States' settlement, the parties will jointly seek
dismissal o f the State Purchaser Actions, and private counsel for the State Purchaser Actions will
seek no further fees or reimbursement of expenses. See 4/16/01 Stipulation of Settlement and
Dismissal at 6-7; see also 11/29/01 Tr. at 30, 27-41. The $4 million figure is the result of
adversarial, arms-length negotiations, and like the $8 million fee for the Plaintiff States, the
negotiated figure is independent o f the consumer fund, which means that the recovery for
consumers will not be diminished if it is awarded. See 11/5/01 Mot. at 15, 18-19. Also
reminiscent of the $8 million award for the Plaintiff States, the $4 million award is reasonable
when viewed as a percentage of the recovery. It represents a mere 5.55% o f the $72 million fund
for consumer claims. Combined with the Plaintiff States' $8 million, the aggregate award
amounts to 13.5% o f the fund, which is also well within the acceptable range of fee recoveries in
antitrust suits in which there is a common fund.24 Moreover, the reasonableness of the requested

23 Since 1998, a total of 41 law firms have prosecuted indirect purchaser lawsuits against
the defendants on an entirely at-risk contingency fee basis. On March 9, 2000, the Court
appointed Zwerling Schächter & Zwerling LLP and Goodkind Labaton Rudoff & Sucharow LLP
as co-lead counsel to orchestrate and coordinate the efforts of counsel for these indirect purchaser
actions. See generally Manual for Complex Litigation (Third). § 20.22 (1995). The. $4 million
will be shared by all these firms. See 11/29/01 Tr. at 163,166-67.
24 Even more accurate percentages, perhaps, can be extracted if one accounts for the fact
that consumers will receive 100% of the fund that has been designated for their claims. Because
of that fact, the attorneys' fees and costs allocated to the Plaintiff States and State Purchaser
Plaintiffs can be added to the consumer fund before considering the relative percentages.
Viewed through this lens, the total fund would be $81,812,128—-that is, $72,048,267 (for
consumer claims) plus $5,763,861 (for Plaintiff States' fees and costs calculated as a
proportionate eight-percent share o f the consumer fund) plus $4,000,000 (for State Purchaser
Plaintiffs' fees and costs). O f that total, $4,000,000 amounts to 4.88% and $5,763,861 amounts
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amount is confirmed when cross-checked, with the lodestar approach. Counsel has submitted
affidavits detailing the significant effort exerted on behalf of the indirect purchaser actions
related to this petition. Forty-one firms prosecuting the indirect purchaser actions have
collectively devoted more than 25,000 hours of professional time amounting to an aggregate
lodestar o f $8,277,762.73. See 11/15/01 Affidavit of Robert S, Schächter ^ 6. As pointed out by
counsel, if this $4 million petition is awarded along with the fees sought in United Wisconsin and
Arkansas Carpenters, discussed below, the resulting multiplier would be less than a modest 1.3.
The Court concludes that the fee is reasonable.
The Court additionally finds the costs request reasonable. As detailed in filed affidavits
and through representations at the fairness hearing, counsel has demonstrated that they advanced
total litigation costs and expenses of $779,148.51 for consulting and retaining experts, reviewing
hundreds of thousands o f documents, creating and maintaining a comprehensive computer
database, and the like. See 11/15/01 Affidavit of Robert S. Schächter ^ 8; see also 11/29/01 Tr.
at 40. Approximately ten percent of the $4 million sought here will be used to reimburse
expenses, and counsel has attributed half of these.expenses to the State Purchaser Actions and
half to the United Wisconsin and Arkansas Carpenters Actions. Accordingly, $389,874.26 will
be reimbursed from the $4 million recovered in this request See 11/15/01 Affidavit of Robert S.
Schächter ^ 8; 11/5/01 Mot. at 24 & n.22; 11/29/01 Tr. at 40. After careful review o f the State
Purchaser Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs petition, and the affidavits submitted and
representations of counsel in support thereof, the Court finds the petition reasonable and will
approve it.

to 7.02%, for an aggregate 11.9%.

(5) Parens Patriae Authority and Class Certification
For the purposes of settlement, the states can be divided into two groups. The first is a
group of forty-three states that have specific authority to represent consumers and to settle and
release their claims pursuant to their respective parens patriae (or equitable equivalent)
authority. The Court preliminarily found that they had such authority on April 27, 2001. Those
states now seek a final ruling that each state has authority to represent consumers and to settle
and release their claims. No one has challenged such authority, and the Court finds that they
have been granted such authority. Fourteen o f these states—California, Colorado, Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia—have expressly conferred parens patriae authority. See Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 16760; Colo. Rev. Stat § 6-4-111; Del. Code Arm. tit. 6, § 2108; D.C. Code
§ 28-4507(b); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-14(c); Idaho Code § 48-108(2)-(4); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 93, § 9; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598A.160(1); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §109.81(A); Or. Rev. Stat. §
646.775; R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-12; S.D. Codified Laws §§ 37-1-23 through -32; Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-10-916, 76-10-918; W. Va. Code § 47-18-17. Sixteen states—Alaska, Arizona,
Florida, Elinois, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—have express
statutory authority to represent consumers in a capacity which is the functional equivalent of
parens patriae. See Alaska Stat. §§ 45.50.501 (a)-(b), 45.50.580(a)-(b); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
44-1407,44-1412; Ariz. Const, art. XIV, § 15; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 542.27(2); 740 111. Comp. Stat.
10/7(2); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-103(a)(8), 50-148(b); Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 11-209; Miss.
Code Ann. §§ 7-5-1, 75-21-37, 75-21-39, and 75-24-1; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 356:4-a, -b, and -31-

c; N.Y. Exec. Law §63(12); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 114-2(8)(a), 75-9 through -16.1; N.D. Cent. Code
§ 51-08.1-07; 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 732-204(c); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2458(b)(2); Va. Code
Ann. §§ 59.1-9.15(a)-(d), 59.1-9.17; Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 133.16, 133.17(1); Wy. Stat. §§ 40-12105,40-12-106, and 40-12-107. Thirteen states—Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, and
Washington—have had state and/or federal courts interpret statutory provisions to effectively
grant parens patriae authority or have determined that their attorney general has such authority
under state common law. See Weaver v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama. 570 So. 2d
675,684 (Ala. 1990); Ky. Rev. Stat. Arm. § 367.200; Kentucky ex rel. Beshear v. ABAC Pest
Control. Inc.. 621 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Bordens. Inc.. 684 So. 2d 1024,1026
(La. CL App. 1996); Lund ex rel. Wilbur v. Pratt. 308 A-2d 554, 558 (Me. 1973); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 5, § 209; State v. Lumberman's Ass'n, Inc.. 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1(62,990,1979
WL 18703, at *6 (Mich. Cir. CL Oct. 29, 1979); Kellev v. Carr. 442 F. Supp. 346, 356-57 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Kellev v. Sclater. 40 B.R. 594, 596-97 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Humphrey v. Ri-MEL.
Inc.. 417 N.W.2d 102, 112 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Minnesota v. Standard Oil Co.. 568 F. Supp.
556, 563 (D. Minn. 1983); Mo. Rev. StaL §§ 27.060,416.061; Clark Oil & Ref. Com, v.
Ashcroft. 639 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Mo. 1982) (en bandy, Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-222(1); State ex
rel. Olsen v. Public Serv. Corrun'n. 283 P.2d 594, 599 (MonL 1955); N.J. StaL Ann. §§ 56:912.b; O'Regan v. Schermerhom. 50 A.2d 10, 15 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1946); Hvland v. Kirkman. 385
A.2d 284, 290 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-5-2, 57-1-7, and 57-1-8;
New Mexico v. Scott & Fetzer Co.. 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1(64,439, 1981 WL 2167, at *1
(D.N.M. Dec. 22, 1981); Term. Code Ann. § 8-6-109(b)(1); State v. Heath. 806 S.W.2d535, 537
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(Term. Ct. App. 1990); State ex rel. Inman v. Brock. 622 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Tenn. 1981); Tex. Bus
& Com. Code Ann. §§ 15.04, 15.20; Abbott Labs, v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d503, 505 (Tex. 1995);
Texas v. Scott & Fetzer Co.. 709 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1983); Bachnvskv v. State. 747
S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1988); Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.080; State v. Taylor. 58
Wash. 2d 252, 255-56 (1961); In re Ins. Antitrust Litig.. 938 F.2d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
The second set is comprised of eight states-—Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana,
Iowa, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South Carolina—that represent their respective citizenconsumers pursuant only to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and therefore seek certification of
a'settlement class defined as follows:
All natural person consumers within Plaintiff States where such a class action may
be brought, not otherwise represented by the Plaintiff States as parens patriae,
who purchased generic lorazepam and/or clorazepate sold in the United States
from January 1, 1998 through December 31, 1999.
The Court conditionally certified this class on April 21, 2001, and the states now seek final
certification for settlement purposes only.25
A settlement class certification must comply with all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and
one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). See Thomas v. Albright. 139 F.3d 227, 234 (D.C.
Cir. 1998). Rule 23(a) permits certification only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the

25
In addition to the eight noted states, the attorneys general of Alaska, California, Florida,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming also seek certification under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 as well as their respective state’s parens patriae or equivalent authority.
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claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed..
R. Civ. Proc. 23(a).
All four requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied here. First, even if based only upon the
more than 244,820 consumers that have already submitted claims for refunds, the numerosity
requirement has been met; this large number clearly renders joinder impracticable. Second,
antitrust actions typically present common questions of law and fact, and here, all claims derive
from the same set of facts. Third, the state agencies' and consumers' claims are typical because
they arose at the same time in the same market and are based on the same theory of damages.
Finally, the attorneys generals of the plaintiff states have no conflicting interests with the
consumers and agencies they represent, have evidenced a genuine interest in this litigation, and
are qualified and experienced. See, e.g.. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig.. 55 F.R.D. 269,274
(D.D.C. 1972) ("And the Court is persuaded that the states,and cities, acting through their
attorneys general and chief law officers respectively, are the best representatives of the
consumers residing within their jurisdictions.").
With respect to Rule 23(b), the plaintiffs have moved for certification under both Rule
23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(1) requires that “separate actions by or against individual
members of the class .would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct of the
party opposing the class." Fed, R Civ. P. 23(b)(1). As the Plaintiff States point out, there are
thousands o f class members located in every jurisdiction in the country, and the claims are
factually and legally complex. Thus, the Court finds a great risk of inconsistent adjudications if
-34-

the class is not certified. Rule 23(b)(3) requires “that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The Rule further provides that matters pertinent to
the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense o f separate actions; (B) the extent and nature o f any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members o f die
class; (C) the. desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation ,o f the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.26
Id. The alleged conspiracy in this case was a monopolization o f the markets for generic
lorazepam and clorazepate and price fixing. Many questions o f law and fact concerning these
antitrust violations predominate over individual class member factual or legal issues. As the
states have indicated, the calculation of individual damages based upon the volume of
prescriptions purchased appears to be the only issue specific to each individual class member,
and it is unlikely that individual consumers would take on the time and expense o f prosecuting
the conspiracy. Rather, the attorney generals of the respective states working together as they
have done in reaching this settlement on behalf of their consumers and agencies appear best
suited to efficiently and effectively prosecute this action. In addition, judicial economy and
convenience to the defendants weigh in favor of class certification and against proceeding with

26
The Supreme Court has stated, however, that “[cjonfironted with a request for
settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried,
would present intractable management problems,. . . for the proposal is that there be no trial. "
Amchem Prods.. Inc, v. Windsor. 521 U.S. 591, 620 (T9971: see Thomas v. Albright. 139F.3d
227, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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thousands of individual actions. For these reasons, the Court will certify the class for settlement
purposes.
B. Third Party Payors
On November 15,2001, the third party payor plaintiffs moved for final approval of the
proposed settlements in United Wisconsin and Arkansas Carpenters, and they petitioned the
Court for attorneys' fees and costs.2728In their motions, the plaintiffs specifically seek: (1) final
approval of the Settlement Agreements; (2) final approval of the Allocation and Distribution
Plans; (3) final approval of petition for attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and incentive awards;
and (4) certification o f their respective classes for settlement purposes only.
(1) Final Approval of Settlement Agreements2*
(a) Artns-Length Negotiations
Settlement negotiations in both cases began in March 2000 and intensified during June
and July 2000. Agreements with Mylan were reached in July 2000 after the FTC agreed to settle
its disgorgement claim with Mylan for $100 million, which would be allocated for recovery for
the Plaintiff States' agency and parens patriae claims. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs also

27 The amounts to be paid by SST under both settlements were subject to a reservation of
rights by SST to terminate its obligation under the settlement in the event that third party payors
that opt out of the United Wisconsin Class paid at least $11,669,008 in the twenty United
Wisconsin states for the drugs in the class period. Under the November 19, 2001 Stipulation and
Order, the parties agreed to extend the original deadline for SST to exercise its right to terminate
to November 21, 2001. However, the parties reported at the hearing that SST did not exercise
that right and were ready to move forward with the settlement. See 11/29/01 Tr. at 60, 98-99,
168.
28 The legal standards for final approval and for each of the factors discussed below have
been discussed at length above and thus will not be reiterated here.
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reached settlement agreements with SST. The parties then engaged in an additional six months
of negotiations to draft the various aspects of the settlement agreements. With respect to those
negotiations, the parties have represented to the Court through filed affidavits and declarations
and representations at the fairness hearing that all decisions concerning offers, counter-offers,
and acceptance and rejection of settlement offers were made by the respective named plaintiffs
through their regularly retained and in-house counsel, in consultation with the respective Third
Party Payor Lead Class Counsel. See 11/14/01 Affidavit of Richard W. Cohen fflf 24-31;
Declaration o f Elizabeth Bartlett

8-10, attached to 11/13/01 Affidavit of Hollis L. Salzman,

Ex. 1; Declaration of Carol Nakhuda, Esq. |^[ 6-7, attached to 11/13/01 Affidavit of Hollis L.
Salzman, Ex. 3; Declaration of Mary Elizabeth Giblin, Esq. f 3, attached to 11/13/01 Affidavit of
Hollis L. Salzman, Ex. 4; Declaration of William H. Pitsenberger, Esq. Tflf 7-9, attached to
11/13/01 Affidavit of Hollis L. Salzman, Ex. 5; 11/13/01 Affidavit o f Joe R. Whatley, Jr. Iflf 6-7.
Following the recommended structure set forth in the Manual for Complex Litigation ("Third). §
20.22 at 26-31 (1995), the Indirect Purchaser Lead Counsel, in consultation with the respective
Third Party Payor Lead Class Counsel, communicated settlement offers to, and received
settlement offers from, counsel for the defendants and SST. Communications to and from the
respective plaintiffs were conducted solely by their Third Party Payor Lead Counsel. See
11/29/01 Tr. at 37-39,42-43, 59, 62, 64-70,162-65; see also 11/14/01 Affidavit of Richard W.
Cohen

24-31; Declaration of Elizabeth Bartlett

8-10, attached to 11/13/01 Affidavit o f

Hollis L. Salzman, Ex. 1; Declaration of Carol Nakhuda, Esq. fflj 6-7, attached to 11/13/01
Affidavit of Hollis L. Salzman, Ex. 3; Declaration of Mary Elizabeth Giblin, Esq. if 3, attached to
11/13/01 Affidavit of Hollis L. Salzman, Ex. 4; Declaration of William H. Pitsenberger, Esq.
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7-9, attached to 11/13/01 Affidavit of Hollis L. Salzman, Ex. 5; Affidavit of Joe R. Whatley, Jr.
116-7.
Two sets of objectors—the objecting Individually Represented Companies ("IRCs")29 and
UnitedHealth Group ("UnitedHealth")— have challenged the fairness of the settlement, claiming
"serious conflict o f interest issues affecting the proposed settlements." 11/29/01 Tr. at 115, 121.
They concede that the structure set up, and process of negotiation followed, by Indirect Purchaser
Lead Counsel, the respective Third Party Payor Lead Class Counsel, and the respective in-house
counsel for the various named plaintiff class representatives is a "fine structure if it does what it's
supposed to do":
There are two competing groups fundamentally here. On the one hand consumers,
as represented by the Attorneys General and the Federal Trade Commission,, and
on the other hand third-party payors. There is a limited pot of money available.
Both want to assert their best claims to that pot of money.. . . Further, in the thirdparty payor case, Mr. Cohen brought [the United Wisconsin] case on behalf of
only certain third-party payors.. . . Nevertheless, there is another. . . group of
third-party payors representing the rest of the universe, the Arkansas Carpenters
class. Again, in the third-party payor pool of money. As Mr. Persky and Mr.
Cohen explained, they erected a structure that at least outwardly suggests that it
might solve the problem. Mr. Persky and Mr. Schachter would represent kind of
the world—I suppose—consumers and all third-party payors; Mr. Cohen and Mr.
McCallister would represent just the United Wisconsin group, and the Whatley
firm would represent just the Arkansas Carpenters firm. Your Honor, I have no
quibbles with that structure. In fact, it's a fine structure if it does what it's
supposed to do. And for perhaps much of the case, it did do what it was supposed

29
Six of the original 17 IRCs—Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of New Mexico, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas (collectively Health Care
Services Corp.), Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Minnesota, Federated Mutual Insurance Co.—opted out and therefore do not join the objections
to the, settlement. The Objecting IRCs are thus comprised of Blue Shield of California, Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, Conseco Companies,
Excellus Health Plan, Inc., The Guardian Life Insurance Co., Humana, Inc., Independence Blue
Cross, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., Trigon Blue Cross
and Blue Shield, and Trustmark Insurance Co. See 11/29/01 Tr. at 84-86, 114,
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to do.
11/29/01 Tr. at 125-26. But they ultimately see a conflict "when there are settlement
negotiations":
What would ideally happen . . . is that unconflicted loyal counsel go in and make
their case to the defendants. Defendants, here's our case, here's what we're doing,
here are our damages, here is the law, here are our claims, here's what we're
entitled to .. . , [B]ut it appears folm their discovery that third-party payor class
counsel didn't do that. They didn't meet with the defendants, they didn't negotiate
with the defendants, and that obviously is critical. Mr. Persky representing the
world was not in a position to make the case of third-party payors to the
defendants and certainly was not in a position to; make the case of the Arkansas
Carpenters claimants versus the United Wisconsin claimants. Limited pot of
money and divergent claims to it.
Id at 127; see also, e.g.. 11/29/01 Tr. at 124 ("Now, class counsel, I think, is suggesting to the
Court that by sitting and waiting by the phones for Mr. Persky to communicate settlement offers,
that they have fulfilled their role."). In other words, they object because Indirect Purchaser Lead
Counsel, rather than the respective Third Party Payor Lead Class Counsel, met with the
defendants and SST. This purported conflict tainted the fairness of the settlement, according to
these objectors, in that the negotiations yielded insufficient settlement funds, unfair distribution
between classes, and unreasonable fee arrangements.
After thoroughly reviewing the affidavits, declarations, and representations of counsel at
the fairness hearing, the Court finds the objectors’ alleged conflict of interest, while perhaps
theoretically plausible, wholly unsubstantiated by the record. It is true that Indirect Purchaser
Lead Counsel met with the defendants and SST. But the objectors have ignored all reality by
implying that the respective Third Party Payor Lead Class Counsel passively allowed Indirect
Purchaser Lead Counsel to negotiate on their behalf. The evidence properly before the Court
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paints a starkly different picture. As Third Party Payor Lead Class Counsel for the United
Wisconsin plaintiffs described it:
The procedure under which we worked, as Mr. Persky referred to, worked
beautifully, and it worked just as contemplated under the manual for complex
litigation 3d, Section 28.221 and 222, which contemplates that in cases,
centralized cases involving multiple parties and multiple classes with possibly
divergent interests, that the Court appoint what's called a designated counsel,
which can be further refined to liaison, lead, et cetera. It also contemplates that
the designated counsel may be in the best position to, because of its day-to-day
contact with the defendants, to actually receive a settlement offer, provided that it
understand from the outset a clearly delineated limitation on its authority, and
that!s what occurred here. Mind you, there were points during the litigation, not
simply at the settlement phase, where we did, in a sense, override the liaison
counsel. For instance, at one point the defendants propounded discovery
concerning, I think it was 21 different drugs, which was not a matter that greatly
affected the consumer cases that Mr. Persky and Mr. Schachter were involved in,
but did affect the third-party payor classes because it was a considerable amount
o f discovery being sought on a case that was concerned with two drugs,
Lorazépam and Clorazepate. And in that instance I dealt directly with Mr. Miller
at Clifford, Chance, Rogers & Wells to refine that discovery request to a
manageable one for the thirty-party payors. In our brief and in our affidavits we
described how the settlement process in this case worked, which was that Mr.
Persky and Mr. Schachter received settlement offers from the defendant:—from
Mylan, and this occurred after the State AGs and the FTC had settled, which were
communicated to me. I then communicated them to Mr. McCallister, who
personally represents Kansas Blue Cross, to Ms. Bartlett, who was the in-house
counsel at United Wisconsin, and to Ms. Giblin, who was in-house counsel at
Care First. I would then confer with them. We would accept, reject, have
counteroffers, et cetera. We would communicate that back to Mr. Persky or Mr.
Schachter. By the way, not once throughout this case had any lawyers from either
the Zwerling or Goodkind firms even met the in-house counsel, the class
representatives. We kept the—we kept the wall—we kept the integrity of the wall
throughout this case. However, we did engage in a coordinated prosecution of
this case with the plaintiffs in the Arkansas Carpenters case and with the group
represented by Mr. Schachter and Mr. Persky with those 13 state cases in the
interest of judicial economy, efficiency and in the interest of our personal
economy and efficiency, and it worked very well.
11/29/01 Tr. at 66-68. Counsel elaborated:
Given [the financial health of Mylan] and given what we had already discussed
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with our expert and the IMS data that we had already reviewed, we came up with
a reasonable range of settlement for the United Wisconsin case, which was the
only case that my clients and I and Mr. McCallister were concerned with. We
didn't give that number to Mr. Persky or Mr. Schachter, but we told them if they
received any offers concerning our case, that they were to communicate to me,
and I glued myself to my chair for the 6th and the 7th of July and also during the
28th and 29th o f June, and I instructed the in-house counsel that my clients do the
same. And we had many, many hours of back and forth during the course o f those
days. Now, the objectors complain that I wasn't in the room. Two things. One,
we did this the way the manual contemplates. And 2 ,1 wasn't in the room for
strategic reasons. We purposely set up this mechanism because it's my experience
from 18 years on the defense side and now four years on the plaintiffs' side in
class action litigation, that the enemy o f settlement is to have a myriad o f different
plaintiff groups represented by different multiple attorneys sitting around a room
and heckling the defendant who wants to know who can I deal with and who can I
settle this with and who can I communicate with without having to hear
everybody's parochial concerns on every matter. And, in fact, early in the case,
Mr. Miller at Rogers-Wells and his partner Mr. Weidner communicated to me that
that was the procedure by which they would appreciate any settlement discussions
to occur, that they would communicate an offer to Persky and Schachter.
Everybody understood that the authority rested with me, with Mr. McCallister and
more importantly with our clients who were not your typical class action
plaintiffs, who have a nominal interest and perhaps don’t even follow the case.
The affidavits of Mr. Schachter, Ms. Bartlett Mr. Pitsenberger, who is the
in-house counsel at Kansas Blue Cross, Ms. Giblin, myself, all attest to the
arm's-length nature o f the United Wisconsin settlement We speak here only for
the United Wisconsin settlement. We have no doubts concerning the others, but
they're outside my bailiwick.
Id. at 71-72; see also id. at 162-63 ("In terms of procedure, again, Mr. Cohen has described it,
and the same procedure applied to [the Arkansas Carpenters case].").30 The Court can find no

30
See also 11/29/01 Tr. at 157-58 ("The memorandum that went among our counsel
before those negotiations occurred was strictly among the United Wisconsin, Kansas, and Care
First counsel, Mr. McCallister and myself. We had our own strategy. We sent—Mr. Persky and
Mr. Schachter went to those negotiations without our number. They were authorized to convey
to us numbers that were presented by Mylan. They did so. We took them up. We kept coining
back and saying not enough, not enough. When they go near our number, we still told them not
enough. We told them when they were getting warm, and when they hit our number we agreed.
And that's how it wen, and that's in evidence. That's not Mr. Garber's, speculation."); id. at 15657 ("[A]U decisions concerning offers, counter-offers, acceptance, rejections in the United
Wisconsin case were made by Mr. McCallister, me and the in-house counsel at Wisconsin
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fault with this structure and process used by counsel throughout the negotiation process, as
counsel for the respective plaintiffs were actively involved and made the key decisions respecting
offers, counter-offers, and the acceptance and rejection thereof. See 11/14/01 Affidavit of
Richard W. Cohen

24-31; Declaration of Elizabeth Bartlett

8-10, attached to 11/13/01

Affidavit o f Hollis L. Salzman, Ex. 1; Declaration of Carol Nakhuda, Esq. f l 6-7, attached to
11/13/01 Affidavit of Hollis L. Salzman, Ex. 3; Declaration o f Mary Elizabeth Giblin, Esq. 1 3,
attached to 11/13/01 Affidavit o f Hollis L. Salzman, Ex. 4; Declaration of William H.
Pitsenberger, Esq.
Joe R. Whatley, Jr.

7-9, attached to 11/13/01 Affidavit o f Hollis L. Salzman, Ex. 5; Affidavit of
6-7. Ultimately, therefore, the Court finds that both settlements were the

products o f arm's length negotiations by experienced counsel, undertaken in good faith and after
substantial factual investigation and legal analysis.3'31

Kansas and Care First Blue Cross, and that's all of our affidavits and that's in evidence and that's
not speculation.").
31
The Court is mystified by the objectors' desire to mediate a way out of the purported
conflict. As Mr. Garber articulated the objectors' position:
And I’ll submit, Your Honor, that if that happens, there can be a resolution. What
I'm not doing here today. Judge, is arguing that the case should be blown up, that
we should start back at ground zero. What I'm arguing is that there is a solution..
.. What I am recommending to the Court is, even before the Court passes on the
fairness of the settlement, because I don't want this case to fall apart, that the
Court consider directing the parties, including the objectors, to engage in
mediation, to do it on a short time schedule, to do it under Court supervision, and
to see if we can arrive at a resolution.
11/29/01 Tr. at 132-33. As stated from the bench at the hearing, however, the Court fails to see
how mediation—as a means o f merely tinkering with the fund allocation and fees— could purge
the taint of a true conflict of interest Rather, if a true conflict existed, it seems to the Court that
the entire settlement would be have to be vacated, new counsel would be necessitated, and the
case would then proceed to trial or be settled through new agreements.
-
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(b) Terms o f Settlement in Relation to Strength o f Plaintiffs' Case
Under the Stipulation of Settlement in United Wisconsin, Mylan agrees to pay $25
million, and SST agrees to pay $285,600, into interest-bearing escrow accounts to be distributed
after final approval o f the settlement. See United Wisconsin Settlement Agreement §§ I.MM,
OLA.323Under the accompanying Allocation and Distribution Plan, the total amount less
attorneys' fees and expenses, costs of administration of the settlement, and incentive awards to
the plaintiffs ("Net Settlement Amount") will be distributed to members o f the United Wisconsin
Class that file timely claims. See United Wisconsin Allocation and Distribution Plan at 3-4.
There are two claim options. Under the first, third party payors that maintained records of the
actual amounts paid or reimbursed for the drugs for persons residing in the United Wisconsin
jurisdictions, and can certify the accuracy of that information, will have their claims recognized
at 100% of such amounts. Under the second claim option* third party payors whose records
enable them to certify only the amounts paid or reimbursed for the drugs for persons residing
throughout the United States can estimate the amounts paid or reimbursed for the drugs for
persons in the United Wisconsin jurisdictions by multiplying the ratio of their "covered lives""3 in

32 Class counsel reported at the fairness hearing that interest on the escrowed settlement
fund is nearly $500,000, yielding a gross settlement fund of approximately $25,775,000. The
administrative expenses total approximately $250,000, with $110,000 spent on notice costs and
$140,000 on settlement administration. After the requested fees, expenses, and incentive awards
sought, over $21.5 million net will be available for distribution to the class members. See
11/29/01 Tr. at 60-61.
33 "Covered Lives" means either the number of: (a) persons covered by a United
Wisconsin Class member's prescription drug benefit plans as o f January 1, 1999; or (b) the
aggregate months of coverage for all persons covered during the Class Period by a United
Wisconsin Class member's prescription drug benefit plans. United Wisconsin Allocation and
Distribution Plan at 4 n. 1.
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the United Wisconsin jurisdictions to their covered lives in the United States by the nationwide
amount. Those claimants will have their claims recognized at 80% of such estimated amounts.
Class members that file timely and valid claims will receive a distribution based on their
distribution ratio, which will be determined by dividing the individual claim by all claims. The
distribution will be calculated by multiplying the ratio by the Net Settlement Amount. See id. at
4.34
In Arkansas Carpenters. Mylan agrees to pay $10 million, and SST agrees to pay
$114,400. See Arkansas Carpenters Settlement Agreement §§ I.LL, III.A.35 The Allocation and
Distribution Plan is essentially identical to the. United Wisconsin plan. As in that plan, the total
amount less attorneys' fees and expenses, costs of administration o f the settlement, and incentive
awards to the plaintiffs ("Net Settlement Amount") will be distributed to members of the
Arkansas Carpenters Class that file timely claims. See Arkansas Carpenters Allocation and
Distribution Plan at 3-4. The same two claim options also exist, and class members that file
timely and valid claims will receive a distribution based on their distribution ratio multiplied by
the Net Settlement Amount. See id at 4.
The plaintiffs correctly note that these settlements ensure recovery of an all cash amount
for third party payors, which must be balanced against the continued expense and risks of the
lengthy and complex antitrust litigation, especially in this case in which an alleged vertical
conspiracy is at issue with Profarmaco and Mylan, for example, at different levels of distribution.

34 At the fairness hearing, class counsel estimated an average distribution of $10,000 per
claimant. 11/29/01 Tr. at 61.
35 SST's total amount in these cases, $400,000, is a portion of the $2 million that it is
paying as part of its global settlement. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
-
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Any prospective award from a jury, of course, presupposes survival of motions to dismiss,
motions for summary judgment, and successful certification of one or more classes in all of the
respective jurisdictions. Even assuming the plaintiffs could surpass such significant hurdles,
post-trial motions and appeals would be likely, which would delay and further risk recovery. See
11/29/01 Tr. at 73-76. As this Court has previously stated:
By reaching a large settlement at a relatively early stage in the litigation, plaintiffs
avoided significant expense and delay and ensured a guaranteed recovery at a high
level. Antitrust price fixing actions are generally complex, expensive, and
lengthy. Trial of this matter easily could have lasted months and may not even
have started for many years; and any verdict inevitably Would have led to an
appeal and might well have resulted in appeals by both sides and a possible
remand for retrial, thereby further delaying final resolution of this case. These
factors weigh in favor of the proposed Settlement.
In re: Vitamins Antitrust Litig.. 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ^72,862, 2000 WL 1737867, *4
(D.D.C. Mar. 31,2000) (citing Slomovics v. All for a Dollar. Inc.. 906 F. Supp. 146, 149
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The potential for this litigation to result in great expense and to continue for a
long time suggest that settlement is in the best interest of the Class.").
The plaintiffs highlight the fact that they are indirect purchasers as one of the most
significant legal impediments to the successful prosecution of their lawsuit. See Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois. 431 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1977) (holding that only direct purchasers have standing to
assert antitrust injury for the purposes of section 4 of the Clayton Act); In re Lorazepam &
Clorazepate Antitrust Litig.. 202 F.R.D. 12, 17-19 (D.D.C. 2001). They further cite substantive
defenses that have been asserted by the defendants such as the defendants' denial that they
proximately caused the alleged antitrust injury and damages when prices were passed down
through many levels of distribution, Mylan’s denial that it cornered the market as its competitors
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obtained API from an alternative supplier, and Mylan's challenge to the relevant product market
definition. The plaintiffs also acknowledge the significant difficulties involved in contested
state-by-state or multi-state class certification proceedings. See 11/29/01 Tr. at 76-79. Finally,
the plaintiffs justify the lesser recovery for the Arkansas Carpenters Class on the basis that the
Arkansas Carpenters jurisdictions do not have state antitrust or consumer protection laws that
permit indirect purchaser claims for antitrust violations, thus leaving them with only unjust
enrichment claims in relatively unchartered territory. See 11/29/01 Tr. at 109-10. When
compared to such risks and costs of continued litigation, the plaintiffs contend, the terms o f the
settlements are fair, reasonable, and adequate.
The IRCs, UnitedHealth, and Health Net, Inc. ("Health Net") filed several sets of
objections to the terms of the settlement.36 The IRCs and UnitedHealth first complain that the
settlements generally short-change third party payors, and all three objectors argue that the
settlement amounts are unfairly disproportionate to the settlement amounts for other victims. For
a benchmark against which to measure the reasonableness of the settlements, the objectors look
to a $388 million figure, referenced in the United Wisconsin Settlement Agreement, that
represents the amount third party payors paid for both drugs during the relevant two-year time
period. They also point to the allegation that Mylan raised prices by 1200% to 4000% and argue
that even using the low-end 1200% figure, the overpayment was at least $355 million. The
settlements' total of $35 million, contend the objectors, appears to be a mere 9.8% of the
damages suffered by third party payors and is thus inadequate. All the objectors additionally

36 The objectors' arguments concerning attorneys' fees are addressed below. See supra pp.
57-59.
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argue that this amount is inadequate because it is smaller than the $71 million recovered by the
Plaintiff States in the settlement on behalf of consumers.
After carefully reviewing the plaintiffs' expert report, the relevant filed affidavits in
evidence, and the representations made by counsel at the hearing, see Redacted Report of John
Pisarkiewicz, Ph. D., 11/14/01 Affidavit of Bernard Persky, Exs. 4-5; 11/14/01 Affidavit of
Richard W. Cohen K2:1; 11/29/01 Tr. at 70-71, 73, 101-04, the Court finds no merit in this,
objection. Although fully litigating the claims through trial could possibly result in a higher
recovery, the settlement represents a necessary compromise between inherent risks of doing so
and a guaranteed cash recovery. The Court is convinced that the $355 million to $388 million
benchmark used by the objectors is inflated and unrealistic. The $388 million figure is the
parties' agreed upon estimate of the retail dollar amount o f all payments and reimbursements
made by the third party payors for all manufacturers' versions o f generic lorazepam and
clorazepate for the entire class period for persons residing in the United Wisconsin jurisdictions.
It does not, therefore, reflect the alleged damages; assuming otherwise would equate damages
with 100% of retail purchases. Moreover, that figure represents the retail sales o f all
manufacturers, not just Mylan, and this Court has rejected the umbrella damages theory. FTC v.
Mvlan Labs.. 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 38-39, 43 (D.D.C. 1999).37 Class counsel thus reasonably relied
on other, more accurate numbers, in consultation with their retained expert. See, e.g.. 11/14/01
Affidavit of Richard W. Cohen Iff 21 ("Between August 1999 and June 2000,1 met with and
spoke on several occasions with plaintiffs' consulting economist, John Pisarkiewicz, Ph.D, to

37
During the relevant time period, Mylan only had approximately 45% o f the market for
lorazepam and 73% o f the market for clorazepate. See Redacted Report of John Pisarkiewicz,
Ph. D. f 35, 11/14/01 Affidavit of Bernard Persky, Ex. 4.
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investigate ranges of damages potentially attainable by United Wisconsin Action clas?
members."). They reviewed Mylan's Annual Report on SEC Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ending March 31, 2000 in preparation for settlement negotiations, which reflected significantly
decreased sales between 1999 and 2000 resulting in a total sales figure of approximately $255
million during the relevant class period. Mylan's Audited Consolidated Balance Sheet showed

that Mylan had aggregate cash and equivalents of approximately $203 million as of March 31,
2000, and Mylan's stock price was at a three-year low. Shortly before it settled with these
plaintiffs, Mylan also had entered into a settlement agreement with the FTC and Plaintiff States
for $100 million plus $8 million in fees, which significantly diminished the available cash.
Mylan contemporaneously had significant exposure to potential liability from the related actions:
Now we're talking about a relatively small, by pharmaceutical company standards,
generic pharmaceutical company that's left with $ 100 million in cash in total still
facing the United Wisconsin action, still facing the Arkansas Carpenters action,
still facing the direct purchaser action, which has many of those same prosecution
advantages that I stated earl[ier] regarding the State A.G.S and the Federal Trade
[Commission, a single unitary claim under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
11/29/01 Tr. at 89-90. The amounts recovered through these settlements represents between
approximately fifteen to thirty percent of the plaintiffs' expert's estimated damages.38 Given the
reality of Mylan's financial condition in July 2000, and the significant hurdles to litigating the
case to a successful and sustainable verdict, the Court finds the settlement amounts to be

38
Under Dr. Pisarkiewicz's analyses, the estimated retail damages caused by Mylan in the
United Wisconsin jurisdictions are $128.9 million, and the estimated disgorgempnt damages are
$80.7 million. See Redacted Report of John Pisarkiewicz, Ph. D. $$ 12, 14, 32, 39,11/14/01
Affidavit of Bernard Persky, Ex. 4. His estimated disgorgement damages in the Arkansas
Carpenters jurisdictions are $68.6 million. See Redacted Report o f John Pisarkiewicz, Ph, D.
8, 26, 11/14/01 Affidavit of Bernard Persky, Ex. 5.
-
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reasonable under the circumstances.39
In addition, the Court agrees with the plaintiffs' position that comparing these settlements
to the FTC and Plaintiff States' settlement is pointless because the FTC already had a
disgorgement ruling in its favor before it settled, it was a single litigant with a nationwide claim
with no procedural impediment to aggregation such as class certification, all fifty states are
involved in that settlement, the State Attorneys General could similarly aggregate their claims
under parens patriae authority, and they had significant direct purchaser claims under Section 4
o f the Clayton Act. The relative plaintiffs had significantly different variables to consider in

39
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that even the objectors took inconsistent
positions with one another on various aspects of the settlements. Despite the fact that they
intended to provide a "joint presentation" on their objections at the fairness hearing, 11/29/01 Tr.
at 114, counsel for UnitedHealth stated that it "was a very good, substantial result to get the
defendants in this case to agree to discharge the amount of money they did," id at 131, and
proceeded to opine that the settlement funds only needed to be allocated differently. By stark
contrast, counsel for the objecting IRCs proclaimed "that this is not a terrific settlement for thirdparty payors, it's a terrible settlement for third-party payors" and prayed for disapproval as the
settlement funds were woefully inapt. Id at 148. As class counsel succinctly responded, "So
much for their coordinated presentation." Id at 155. And despite counsel's opinion on the
"terribleness" o f the settlements, several of his clients nonetheless opted in. All parties agree that
the third party payors, including the IRCs, are sophisticated entities with a significant financial
stake in this case. See, e.e.. 11/29/01 Tr. at 90-91 ("MR. COHEN:. .. Here we have a class of
sophisticated, well-heeled third-party payors with substantial financial stakes."); id at 118 ("MR.
RH OA D :. . . Moreover, our clients are all sophisticated companies, as Mr. Cohen mentioned.
They Operate in a highly competitive market and they are very much concerned about their
business operations."). The fact that many of the IRCs themselves decided to opt-into the
settlements therefore lends little credibility to counsel's position on their "terribleness." As the
Seventh Circuit recently stated in a similar situation, "Unlike members of the consumer class,
[third party payors] are sophisticated purchasers of pharmaceuticals. Their consent to this deal
shows that a larger judgment was unlikely." In re Svpthroid Marketing Litis.. 264 F.3d 712, 717
(7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.). Such inconsistencies among objectors illustrate the
complexities inherent in class action settlement efforts and highlight the reasonableness o f the
compromise embodied in the settlements reached here.
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contemplating settlement.40
Second, the IRCs, UnitedHealth, and Health Net provide a set o f objections concerning
the differences between the United Wisconsin and Arkansas Carpenters settlements.
UnitedHealth and Health Net object to the unequal amounts allocated to each respective
settlement class. This objection, however, ignores Illinois Brick and this Court's prior rulings

40
In this regard, counsel for the objecting IRCs made several representations to the Court
at the fairness hearing that—at a minimum—lack credibility:
MR. SIMMER:. . . Now, Mr. Cohen spoke about a pragmatic settlement. The.
problem with that, Your Honor—and he gave us a parade of horrors about how
difficult this case would have been. The problem with that, of course, Your
Honor, is that this same parade of horrors is the same horrors that the States and
the FTC face in large part in prosecuting their case. They would have faced
almost, identical defenses in many respects with regard to definition of the relevant
market and proof problems, as well.
THE COURT: FTC has the same problem with standing and being the proper
plaintiff to bring the case?
MR. SIMMER: I'll concede on that point, Your Honor. FTC did not have a
standing issue, but you may remember, as originally filed, the FTC's complaint
was on behalf of all injured parties, including corporate injured parties; that the
fact that that portion of the settlement got left on the settlement room floor really
speaks volumes about the problems with the settlement, we would submit
***

MR. GENTILE: And the fact that the FTC— In fact, we called the FTC, Your
Honor, to tell them what was happening here. We've been informed by officials
of the FTC, and I've been authorized to say to you, that their position is that they
have never represented coiporate parties, that the disgorgement that they sought
under the FTC Act was meant to either pay consumers, which they are doing
through the use of the Attorneys General as a mechanism to do that. The other
alternative with that money was to turn it over to the Federal Treasury. They
declined to do that.
11/29/01 Tr. 136-37, 150-51.
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that indirect purchaser damages claims would be recognized only under the laws of states with
express rights of action for indirect purchasers. FTC v. Mvlan Labs.. 62 F. Supp. 2d at 43. The
respective amounts reflect such rulings in that they account for the weaker claims of the
Arkansas Carpenters class members in states without Illinois Brick repealers and in which they
would relying solely on common law unjust enrichment claims.
In a similar vein, the IRCs object that the United Wisconsin settlement improperly
excludes Nebraska claims because the state recognizes indirect purchaser claims.41 This
objection, too, lacks merit. A plaintiff is master of its claim, which is equally true of a class
plaintiff. Class counsel has averred that none of the United Wisconsin plaintiffs conducts
meaningful business in Nebraska, and Nebraska law claims were not included in any complaint
they filed. If the objecting IRCs believed they had a meritorious Nebraska claim, they had the
option to prosecute it. Their failure to do so does not render this settlement unfair or
unreasonable.
The IRCs, UnitedHealth, and Health Net also claim that the determination of class
membership in the respective classes by state of residence of beneficiaries is inaccurate, arbitrary,
and burdensome. They claim that it is inaccurate because few third party payors track place of

41
For support, the objectors cite the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act, Neb. Rev. Stat
§§ 59-1601(2) ("Trade and commerce shall mean the sale of assets or services and any commerce
directly or indirectly affecting the people o f the State of Nebraska."); 59-1602 ("Unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct o f any trade or commerce
shall be unlawful."); 59-1603 ("Any contract, combination, in the form o f trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce shall be unlawful."); and 59-1609 ("Any person who
is injured in his business or property by a violation of sections 59-1602 to 59-1606, or any person
so injured because he refuses to accede to a proposal for an arrangement which, if consummated,
would be in violation of sections 59-1603 to 59-1606, may bring a civil action in the district
court to enjoin further violations, to recover the actual damages sustained by h im . . . .").
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residence for all of those covered by their plans (e.g., child away from college), and in the IRCs'
and UnitedHealth's view, the dichotomy is arbitrary and burdensome because participation in the
settlement is not tied to the place where prescriptions are filled, as many dependants cross state
lines when filling prescriptions. A better approach, they claim, would tie participation in the
classes to the location of the pharmacy where prescriptions are filled because third party payors
regularly track such information. They ultimately believe that parity should exist between the
jurisdictions. Health Net similarly contends that there is no support for the currently devised
two-class dichotomy in this case. But in stark contrast to the pharmacy and parity approach
proposed by the other objectors, it believes that states like California, where "abundant case law
makes clear that indirect purchasers may recover treble damages" and attorneys’ fees, should
receive a greater share of any recovery. Health Net Mem. at 4-5.
The Court finds that the plaintiffs' choice to base class eligibility upon the class members'
plan members' states of residence fair and reasonable because it generally comports with the
purposes o f the states' antitrust laws. The IRC's and UnitedHealth's proposed alternative of
pharmacy location, as pointed out by class counsel, is not necessarily better because most
individuals purchase their pharmaceuticals in their state of residence, and even where that is not
the case, basing class eligibility on pharmacy location would result in anomalous situations in
which a Maryland resident, for example, could benefit from the District's Illinois Brick repealer,
even though the Maryland legislature has chosen not to afford its residents such protections.
Moreover, a substantial percentage of prescriptions are filled by mail order pharmacies, one of
the largest of which is located in Ohio, which is a non-United Wisconsin j urisdiction. Despite
the encouragement to third party payors' members to use mail order prescriptions, the pharmacy-

-
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location approach would deny third party payors the benefit of recovery when their members
used this feature. While the respective settlement amounts may not be perfect for all affected
third party payors, it represents a reasonable compromise, which is perhaps best illustrated by the
fact that even the objectors disagree with one another on this issue: the objecting IRCs and
UnitedHealth would divide the funds equally between the classes, while the other objector,
Health Net, would direct greater amounts of money toward states like California.
Third, the IRCs and UnitedHealth have lodged objections against the claim process.
They contend that the two options for calculating payments for the purpose o f submitting claims
effectively exclude indemnity payments, in which the payor pays the pharmacist and is
subsequently reimbursed upon submission o f the claim to the insurance company. Normally,
they point out, indemnity payors do not have a claim record detailing reimbursement for specific
drugs and thus will be unable to provide the necessary claims information. Yet, here, indemnity
payors would have to. provide evidence of the claimed payment. They estimate that up to ten
percent of third party payor claims are such indemnity payors. See 11/29/01 Tr. at 138-40. Such
payors did not opt-out, the objectors explain, because they "found themselves in [a] catch-22":
MR. SIMMER: . . . To file a claim in this settlement, you had to have a specific
claim record of your payments for these two drugs. Indemnity payors don't have
that, so they couldn't make a claim. Okay. One might ask, why didn't they opt
out? Mr. Cohen has explained, to opt out of this settlement, you also had to
provide data about your payments for these two drugs.
Id. at 139-40.
But the Court finds this objection misplaced and counsel's representation with respect to
it rather disturbing. The Court agrees with the plaintiffs that the objectors would fare no better
proceeding to trial, as they would have to demonstrate damages, and it would be unfair to permit
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this ten percent of the population to block the settlement for the other ninety percent when the ten
percent simply could have opted out. What is appalling to the Court in relation to this objection
is that in making the IRCs' case, counsel appears to have grossly misrepresented facts to the
Court, as pointed out by class counsel:
MR. COHEN:. . . I have to go further than that, however, because Mr. Simmer,
when asked why they didn't opt out, told the Court an absolute lie. He said that
we didn't opt out because we had to provide—in order to opt out, we had to
provide our claims information. He knows full well that is not true, that the class
information was requested, not required. That was clarified in a letter prior to the
deadline date. And, in fact, Mr. Simmer's firm did opt out for clients and
provided no claims information. They knew full well that was not required.
Id. at 154. Needless to say, the Court finds no credibility in the objectors' counsel's arguments on
the purported "catch 22. "42 The information for opt-outs in the United Wisconsin settlement was

42
At the hearing, in fact, the Court had to ask counsel repeatedly for a clarification, of the
objections' reasons for not opting out. The Court finds the responses o f IRCs’ counsel ambiguous
and disgenuine, if not totally incredible. Counsel began by volunteering:
MR. RHOAD:. . . Why we didn't opt out. That was the question posed by Mr.
Cohen here today suggesting that our clients spoke with their feet, I guess is the
term that he used, by remaining in the class. Well, the answer to that
question—it's a very good question as a preliminary matter, but he answer is two
fold, Your Honor. And I believe that you will find that both answers or both parts
of the answer are compelling. While opting out may very well have been the
easiest route for our client to take to demonstrate their dissent in this case, our
clients have elected instead to taken a stand. They're concerned that if attempts
are not made to correct the substantial problems they have identified with these
proposed settlements, that there is the very real and significant risk that these
same problems will affect settlement proposed in future cases of a similar nature..
. . The second concern of our clients, which compelled their election to remain in
the class and submit objections rather than opt out, is their recognition that the
settlement funds established in this case of consumers and third-party payors . . .
is their recognition that the settlement fund established in this case for consumers
and third-party payors is not insubstantial. .. the problem here isn’t necessarily
the amount of the settlement fund, but rather the way the settlement fund has bee
allocated among the parties . . . .
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requested, not required, and the plaintiffs made the request because that settlement, and not the
Arkansas Carpenters settlement, was subject to a reduction provision if opt-outs exceeded a
certain threshold and an SST termination provision if the opt-outs exceeded another threshold
figure. The requested information was used solely to determine whether those thresholds were
met. See 11/29/01 Tr. at 97-99. Requesting such information was reasonable.
Finally, UnitedHealth objects to the releases, citing a parade of horribles including
potential violations of ERISA if third parly payers who have no authority to do so release claims
of beneficiaries. But the Court is satisfied with class counsel's explanation of the agreements'
savings clause; it does not release the claims of beneficiaries and affiliates "to the extent that any
such Person's claim is independent of such Person's relationship to Plaintiffs or Settlement Class
Members." Settlement Agreement If I.KK; see also 11/29/01 Tr. at 99.
For all o f the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the terms of the settlements,
when compared to. the strength of the plaintiffs' cases, are fair, adequate, and reasonable, and this
factor accordingly favors final approval.

11/29/01 Tr. at 119-21: see also id. at 149 ("MR. SIMMER:. . . "[A]s Mr. Rhoad explained
earlier, what we're trying to do is take a stand here."). Far from "compelling," however, the
Court finds the first, what the Court will deem "class action martyr" reason, unbelievable. Rather
than having counsel write an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, or Washington
Post, counsel incredibly asks the Court to believe that their clients wanted to remain part of a
settlement that in their view was "terrible", while their colleagues opted-out, to set a better
precedent for class actions generally, despite counsel's, statement that they "are all sophisticated
companies . . . [and] operate in a highly competitive market and they are very much concerned
about their business operations." 11/29/01 Tr. at 118. The second reason therefore is much more
credible, albeit entirely unhelpful to the objectors in that it bolsters the reasonableness of the
settlement funds. See supra note 39. As perhaps best articulated by class counsel, "We heard
quite a bit from the objectors as to why they didn't opt out. And I'll suggest that they never gave
you the honest answer. They don't want to walk away from $25 million in [the United'
Wisconsin] case. That’s why they didn’t walk out." 11/29/01 Tr. at 154.
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(c) Status o f Litigation at Time o f Settlement
The plaintiffs had sufficient information at the time they entered these settlement
agreements. As discussed in significant detail above, class counsel conducted an extensive
investigation from May 1999 to July 2000 relating to the claims and underlying events and
transactions alleged in the complaints: During coordinated discovery, they reviewed hundreds of
thousands of pages o f parly and non-party documents were reviewed, and in excess of seventy
party and non-party depositions had been taken. They also consulted with experienced
economics experts and ultimately retained John Pisarkiewicz, Ph.D. in August 1999, whose
reports have been filed with the Court, to advise them on matters of class injury and damages.
(d) Reaction o f Class
Pursuant to the Courts preliminary approval order, over 13,000 copies of the Notice of
Settlement of Class Actions, Proof of Claim, and Notice of Exclusion were mailed directly to
class members in both actions. Out o f large and sophisticated classes in each action, three sets of
objections have been filed on behalf of a total of thirteen objectors. Only a handful of managed
care companies and a small number of self-funded third party payor plans, totaling fourteen third ‘
party payors, have opted out of United Wisconsin. Similarly, only seventeen have opted out of
Arkansas Carpenters. See, e.g.. 11/14/01 Affidavit of Bernard Persky

94.43 The fact that such

an overwhelming majority of class members elected to stay in the class evidences a favorable
reaction by the class to the settlement. And although several objections were filed by a relatively

43
A Schedule of Opt-Outs for each case is attached as Exhibit 1 to the respective orders
and final judgments, which accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
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few members of the class, for the reasons discussed at length above they ultimately present no
obstacle to final approval. Accordingly, this factor supports final approval of the settlements.
(e) Opinion o f Experienced Counsel
Class counsel has substantial experience in litigating and resolving complex cases,
including pharmaceutical overcharge antitrust matters on behalf o f classes o f sophisticated third
party payors. See, e.g.. 11/14/01 Affidavit of Richard W. Cohen 1 4. Given the arms-length
negotiations conducted by counsel, counsel's consultation with the plaintiffs' retained expert, and
their extensive discovery and investigation, the Court will credit counsel's opinion that these
settlements are fair, reasonable, and adequate.
(2) Final Approval of the Allocation and Distribution Flan
For the specific reasons discussed at length above respecting the Allocation and
Distribution Plan in each case, see supra pp. 43-55, the Court finds the plans fair and reasonable
and will approve them.
(3) Final Approval of Attorneys' Fees and Costs
In United Wisconsin. Third Party Payor Lead Class Counsel specifically seek approval of
the following: (I) a fifteen percent attorneys' fee; (2) reimbursement o f out-of-pocket litigation
costs and expenses in the amount of $278,267.33; and (3) payment of an incentive award of
$25,000 for each o f the named plaintiffs. In Arkansas Carpenters. Third Patty Payor Lead Class
Counsel similarly seek: (1) a 22.5% fee; (2) reimbursement o f $110,000 in costs; and (3)
payment of an incentive award of $10,000 to each of the named plaintiffs in the Middle
Tennessee and Cement Masons actions.
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The IR.Cs-and UnitedHealth object to the fee petitions. Pooling together the fees sought
here by United Wisconsin Third Party Payor Lead Class Counsel, the fees sought by Arkansas
Carpenters Third Party Payor Lead Class Counsel, and the $4 million sought by Indirect
Purchaser Lead Counsel for the benefit o f approximately forty-one firms representing the State
Purchaser Plaintiffs, they contend that the $10 million in attorneys' fees is excessive when
juxtaposed to the total recovery of $35 million. They allege that the respective Third Party Payor
Lead Class Counsel did not earn the requested awards because they merely piggy-backed on the
FTC's and Plaintiff States' work.
The Court disagrees. Under the legal standard and relevant factors detailed at length
above, see supra pp. 24-26, the Court finds the attorneys' fees and costs petition in both cases fair
and reasonable and will accordingly approve them. First, the objectors have erroneously
conflated the relevant figures. Despite the fact that Indirect Purchaser Lead Counsel will receive
a portion of the fees requested here, the $4 million fee that Mylan has agreed to pay them in
connection with the settlement of the FTC's and Plaintiff States' action and dismissal of the State
Purchaser Actions was separately negotiated and is wholly independent of the fees requested in
these cases. It should be evaluated accordingly, as the Court has done. See supra pp. 28-30.
Similarly, the fees sought here are independent of one another, as United Wisconsin Third Party
Payor Lead Class Counsel and Arkansas Carpenters Third Party Payor Lead Class Counsel have
litigated, negotiated, and settled their respective cases in an independent, albeit coordinated,
fashion.
Second, counsel in both cases correctly note that the fifteen percent contingency fee
sought in the United Wisconsin case and the 22.5% sought in the Arkansas Carpenters action are
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at the low end of the acceptable range of fee awards, in common fund cases.44 As noted above,
while fee awards in common fund cases range from fifteen to forty-five percent, the normal range
of fee recovery in antitrust suits is twenty to thirty percent o f the common fund. See Swedish
H qsp. Corp.. 1 F.3d at 1271-72; see also In re Aetna Inc.. MDL No. 1219, 2001 WL 20928 (E.D.

Pa. Jan. 4, 2001) (finding thirty percent to constitute a reasonable award); In re AmpiciUin
Antitrust Litie.. 526 F. Supp. 494,498 (D.D.C. 1981) (noting that while the bulk of fee awards in
antitrust cases are less than twenty-five percent, several courts have awarded more than forty
percent o f the settlement fund). Contrary to the objectors' conclusory speculation about counsel’s
efforts, this has been a lengthy and complex antitrust case, involving multiple jurisdictions,
extensive investigation and discovery, coordination, and negotiations. Counsel in these cases are
experienced antitrust litigators, and they have detailed their efforts in these cases in affidavits
filed with the Court. See 11/14/01 Affidavit of Richard W. Cohen; 11/13/01 Affidavit of Joe R.
Whatley, Jr.; 11/14/01 Affidavit o f Bernard Persky; 11/13/01 Affidavit of Robert S. Schachter.
As a result o f their efforts, the United Wisconsin class members, numbering in the thousands, are
expected to recover thousands of dollars each from a total fund of $25,285,600, and the estimated
13,000 Arkansas Carpenters class members will recover a total of $10,114,400.

44
Counsel in United Wisconsin negotiated 15% fee retainer agreements with the class
plaintiffs at the outset o f the case, and through a candid statement at the fairness hearing revealed
the modest nature of the fees involved here:
I can assure you that if I knew then what I now, I never would have agreed to the
15 percent standing here two and half years later. It’s the lowest fee we've ever
agreed to in one of these cases, and in our subsequent fee agreements we've
refused to accept that given the complexities involved in these cases and the
length of time it takes to collect.
11/29/01 Tr. at 105.
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With respect to costs, counsel in United Wisconsin seek reimbursement of out-of-pocket
expenses totaling $278,267.33, and counsel in Arkansas Carpenters seek $110,000. In addition,
the plaintiffs seek incentive payments of $25,000 to each o f the three class representatives in the
United Wisconsin case and $10,000 each to the three named plaintiffs in Arkansas Carpenters.
Middle Tennessee, and Cement Masons.45 The allocation for the out-of-pocket expenses is
detailed in counsel's affidavits and has not been disputed, see, e.g.. 11/13/01 Affidavit of Robert
S. Schachter If 8, and the Court fmds the respective claimed expenses reasonable. The Court also
finds the incentive awards to be reasonable under the circumstances. "Incentive awards are 'not
uncommon in class action litigation and particularly where . . . a common fund has been created
for the benefit of the entire class.'. . . In fact, '[cjourts routinely approve incentive awards to
compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provided and the risks they incurred during the
course o f the class action litigation.'" Cullen v. Whitman Med. Com.. 197 F.R.D. 136 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (quoting In re So. Ohio Correctional Facility. 175 F.R.D. 270, 272 (S.D. Ohio 1997)).
Counsel has sufficiently explained that the named plaintiffs in both cases provided in-house
counsel, fraud investigators, and pharmacy benefits managers to aid in the prosecution of this
case, whose efforts included investigating, negotiating, responding to discovery demands*
attending meetings, coordinating with other in-house counsel, and directing class counsel in
settling the case. See 11/14/01 Affidavit of Richard W. Cohen |^f 12-14, 17; Declaration of
Carol Nakhuda, Esq. fflf 5-6, attached to 11/13/01 Affidavit o f Hollis L. Salzman, Ex. 3; 11/14/01
Affidavit of Bernard Persky iflf 11-13. The aggregate incentive awards respectively represent
approximately 0.3% o f each class's recovery. As with the expenses, these requests are

45 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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uncontested, and the Court finds them reasonable and will accordingly approve the petition.
(4) Certification of Classes for Settlement Purposes Only
Finally, the United Wisconsin plaintiffs seek final certification of the following class for
settlement purposes only:
All Third Party Payors (as described below) that have reimbursed or otherwise
paid, in whole or part, for prescriptions of tablets of generic Lorazépam or generic
Clorazepate (the "Drugs") filled during the period January 1,1998 through
December 31,1999 (the "Class Period") for natural persons resident in Arizona,
California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, West
Virginia, and/or Wisconsin (the "United Wisconsin Jurisdictions") (the
"Settlement Class"). "Third Party Payor" means any non-governmental entity that
is (i) a party to contract, issuer of a policy, or sponsor of a plan, which contract
policy or plan provides prescription drug coverage to natural persons, and is also
(ii) at risk, pursuant to such contract, policy or plan, to pay or reimburse the
amount associated with the cost of prescription drugs to natural persons covered
by such contract, policy, or plan.
11/15/01 Mot. at 2-3. The plaintiffs in Arkansas Carpenters similarly seek certification of the
following class for settlement purposes only:
All Third Party Payors (as described below) that have reimbursed or otherwise
paid, in whole or part, for prescriptions of tablets of generic Lorazépam or generic
Clorazepate (the "Drugs") filled during the period January 1,1998 through
December 31, 1999 (the "Class Period") for natural persons resident in Alaska,
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, and/or Wyoming
(the "Settlement Class"). "Third Party Payor" means any non-govemmental entity
that is (i) a party to contract, issuer of a policy, or sponsor of a plan, which
contract policy or plan provides prescription drug coverage to natural persons, and
is also (ii) at risk, pursuant to such contract, policy or plan, to pay or reimburse the
amount associated with the cost of prescription drugs to natural persons covered
by such contract, policy, or plan.
11/15/01 Mot. at 2. A settlement class certification must comply with all four prerequisites of
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Rule 23(a) and one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b). See Thomas v. Albright. 139 F.3d
227, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Rule 23(a) permits certification only if: (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder o f all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses o f the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
o f the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(a).
The classes meet all four requirements of Rule 23(a). First, there are over 13,000 class
members involved in the cases, rendering joinder impracticable. See, e.g.. 11/14/01 Affidavit of
Bernard Persky f 94 & n.20; Affidavits of Dawn E. Addazio 1} 11, attached to 11/14/01 Affidavit
o f Bernard Persky, Exs. 2-3. Second, there are several questions of fact and law common to each
class pertaining to the liability and damages for the alleged antitrust violations, as discussed at
length above. Third, the plaintiffs’ claims are typical o f their respective class members in that
they allege illegal combination, conspiracy, or agreement by the defendants which resulted in the
anticompetitive injuries^ Finally, the Court finds no conflicting interests with absent members of
the class, cfi. e.g„ supra pp. 38-42, and it finds that the representative parties have a genuine
interest in this litigation and that their counsel are qualified and experienced.
With respect to¡ Rule 23(b), the plaintiffs have moved for certification under Rule
23(b)(3), which requires "that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication o f the controversy."
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(b). Rule 23(b)(3) further provides that matters pertinent to the findings
include:
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(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (.D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3).
The plaintiffs have satisfied the Rule 23(b)(3) requirement as well. They correctly
highlight the feet that predominance is readily met in these types of cases, which allege violations
o f antitrust laws. See, e.e.. Amchem Prods.. Inc, v. Windsor. 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997)
("Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or
violations o f the antitrust laws."). The Court does not find this case to be an exception
considering the nature of the complex issues involved in this antitrust case that are common to
the class. And the Court is satisfied that the class action is superior for handling the claims o f the
13,000 individuals involved in these cases nationwide; addressing them individually obviously
would waste judicial resources and result generally in great inefficiency. The Court therefore
will grant class certification in each case for settlement purposes only.
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m . CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, in the FTC/Plaintiff States' action the Court will: (1) grant final
approval of the Mylan Settlement Agreement and the SST Settlement Agreement; (2) grant final
approval o f the Plaintiff States' proposed distribution plans; (3) grant final approval of the
payment of the costs of notice and claims administration; (4) grant final approval of the payment
'

o f the Plaintiff States' attorneys' fees and litigation costs; and (5) grant certification of the
appropriate class for settlement purposes only. In each of third party payor actions, the Court
will: (1) grant final approval of the Settlement Agreement; (2) grant final approval of the
Allocation, and Distribution Plan; (3) grant final approval o f the petition for attorneys' fees,
litigation expenses, and incentive awards; and (4) grant certification of the respective class for
settlement purposes only. Appropriate final judgments and orders will accompany this
Memorandum Opinion.
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